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Robert W. Gordon*
Critical legal writers pay a lot of attention to history. In fact,
they have probably devoted more pages to historical description-
particularly the intellectual history of legal doctrine-than to any-
thing else, even law and economics. Such a preoccupation within a
radical movement is at first glance surprising. After all, lawyers
have, by notorious custom, used history conservatively, appealing to
continuity and tradition.1 And in the less common situations in
which lawyers have used history to criticize the status quo, they have
usually resorted to social and economic history, to show that the orig-
inal social context of a legal rule reveals it was adopted for wicked or
obsolete reasons, rather than to the history of legal doctrine.2 What
could conceivably be radical-or, as some unkindly ask, even inter-
esting-about rewriting the history of doctrine?
I will attempt, in this article, to give a brief account of the im-
pulses that have prompted the Critical scholars to their chosen ways
of writing history (or rather histories, since the movement has actu-
ally spawned several different historiographical practices). I'll start
by trying to describe a vision of law-in-history that has tended, as I'll
* Professor of Law, Stanford University. I am grateful to Paul Brest, Tom Heller, Fred
Konefsky, Elizabeth Mensch, Deborah Rhode, Mark Tushnet, and especially to Steve Dia-
mond, Lawrence Friedman, Tom Grey, Mark Kelman, Jack Schlegel, Bill Simon, and Dave
Trubek for reading earlier drafts and suggesting revisions. Willard Hurst gave the manu-
script his usual incredibly close attention, wrote a dozen pages of detailed comments, ap-
proved what he could with characteristic generosity, and vigorously challenged what he could
not; this article continues a longstanding conversation with him. I owe a special debt to
David Sugarman, who has generously shared his ideas with me for years and whose invalua-
ble and (unlike this piece) copiously footnoted manuscript, Sugarman, Towards a New Hitory
of Law and Matenal Society in England, 1750-1914, in LAW, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 1750-1914 (G. R. Rubin & D. Sugarman eds.) (forthcom-
ing), which arrived as I started to think about this article, has impressed its influence on every
page.
1. Horwitz, Book Review, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275, 275-76 (1973).
2. Doctrinal history has not always been conservative. Radical legal argument used to
draw upon its own notions of the ancient constitution, which was to be reclaimed by revolu-
tion from a corrupt present. See, e.g., C. HILL, The Norman Yoke, in PURITANISM AND
REVOLUTION: SOURCES IN INTERPRETATION OF "IHE ENGLISH REVOLUTION OF THE 17TH
CENTURY 58 (1958).
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argue, to dominate liberal legal scholarship. I will then outline some
of the Critical insights that have developed-many of them within
liberal scholarship itself-to corrode separate components of that
dominant vision. Next I'll show how Critical writers have tried io
build these insights into a more thorough critique and how this cri-
tique has affected the ways in which they go about their work. Fi-
nally, I will discuss some common attacks on Critical histories, add a
few doubting remarks of my own, and proffer some suggestions and
exhortations for future directions.3
I have little hope, in the pages that follow, of making a new con-
tribution to the longstanding debates over theory and method in
socio-legal history.4 I'm really only concerned with summarizing, in
what I would like to think is a clarifying way, some of the main posi-
tions in these debates, aware that the outcome of such an effort is
bound to look like a seed catalogue or a Pocket Guide to the Common and
Exotic Varieties of the Social/Legal Histories of North America. The audi-
ence I would most like to reach is that of liberal lawyers who are
interested enough -in Critical legal writing to be curious about it and
who might find it more persuasive as well as more accessible if
equipped with such a little guidebook.5
As the bulk of this piece is committed to describing criticisms of a
tradition of historiography called "legal functionalism," I should also
say that this is the tradition that has done most to nurture and in-
3. The knowledgeable reader will have noticed that this outline follows a format (ortho-
doxy synthesized-partial critiques-total critique and transcendence-critique of the cri-
tique) that has become almost as stylized in CLS work as the sonata form was in classical
composition. Perhaps it's time for a new format.
4. Still less does this piece try to join the interesting controversies among Marxist his-
torians and theorists. Although these controversies have counterparts in the literature of
American legal scholarship, they are almost never referred to in that literature. Further, any
attempt to describe the controversies would require introduction to a lot of specialized con-
cepts and jargon. For a useful recent survey of these controversies, see G. MCLENNAN,
MARXISM AND THE METHODOLOGIES OF HISTORY (1981).
5. Mine is hardly the first such guidebook. For exceptionally useful treatments of so-
cial/theoretical issues in legal historiography, see A. HuNT, THE SOCIOLOGICAL MOVEMENT
IN LAW (1978): Friedman, Some Problems and Possibilities of American LegalHiston; in THE STATE
OF AMERICAN HISTORY 3 (H. Bass ed. 1970); Holt, Alorton Horwitz and the Tranfformation of
American Legal Histoq, 23 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 663 (1982); Scheiber, At the Bordeilandof Law
and Economic Histor: The Contributions of Willard Hurst, 75 AM. HIST. REX. 744 (1970);
Sugarman, Theogy and Practice in Law and History: A Prologue to the Stud of the Relationshtp Between
Law and Economy From a Socio-Historical Perspective, in LAW, STATE, AND SOCIETY (B. Fryer. A.
Hunt, D. McBarnet, & B. Moorhouse eds. 1981); Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis qfAmerican Law.
1 MARXIST PERSPECTIVES 96 (1978); Abel, Book Review, 80 MICH. L. REV. 785 (1980);
Diamond, Book Review, 77 MICH. L. REV. 784 (1979); Feinman, Book Review, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 722 (1980); Horwitz, supra note 1.
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spire my own work and there isn't one of its insights, including those
I have come to think mistaken, that I haven't found useful. More-
over, as is so often true of really good history, the best writing in this
tradition is always grandly overflowing its conceptual channels; one
could do worse than to keep trying to imitate the practices of the
great functionalist figures even after one has stopped accepting their
theories.
I. THE DOMINANT VISION: EVOLUTIONARY FUNCTIONALISM
A. Common Threads
Over the last 150 years or so, enlightened American legal opinion6
has adhered with remarkable fidelity to what, in broad conception,
looks like a single set of notions about historical change and the rela-
tion of law to such change. Stated baldly, these notions are that the
natural and proper evolution of a society (or at least of a "progres-
sive" society, to use Maine's qualification7) is towards the type of lib-
eral capitalism seen in the advanced Western nations (especially the
United States), and that the natural and proper function of a legal
system is to facilitate such an evolution. (The words "natural" and
''proper" stress the normative nature of the theory; deviations from
the norm are both atypical and bad.) Let me try to break this very
general account down into some more manageable pieces, the hand-
ful of propositions that compose its core. Readers will, I hope, under-
stand that what I'm constructing is an "ideal type": a list of the
propositions that one could expect most legal writers within the dom-
inant tradition to accept most of the time, even if one could also
expect that any individual writer would want to qualify or even vio-
lently object to one or two of them.8
6, I'm speaking here not of the work of professional legal historians but of the back-
ground assumptions about law-in-history that are present in mainstream legal scholarship
generally.
7. See H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SO-
CIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 21-22 (London 1861).
8. The danger in trying to set down such a list, of course, is that readers-especially the
readers who believe that their own world view is the one about to be made into a target-will
say, "Well, who accepts that? I don't know any legal writer who subscribes to that view, at
least not in such a simple-minded form. Who exactly is Gordon talking about here?" One
way to deflect this reaction in advance would be to offer a long list of passages from main-
stream legal scholarship that exemplify these core propositions. This might indeed be done,
but it would take a lot of space to do it, in part because these propositions are rarely found in
the baldly explicit form in which they are stated here. They appear in conventional legal
discourse more as diffuse background assumplioav, seemingly too unproblematic to need spell-
ing out. I have decided against trying to document my list in this fashion, less (I hope) out of
January 1984]
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1. "Law" and 'society" are separate social categories, each describable
independently from the other but related to each other
through various mechanisms of causal linkage.
Writers in the dominant tradition make an important, though
usually silent, move even before they start saying anything substan-
tive about law-in-history: They divide the world into two spheres,
one social and one legal. "Society" is the primary realm of social
experience. It is "real life": What's immediately and truly impor-
tant to people, like desire and its fulfillment or frustration, goes on
there. This realm is the realm of production, commerce, the market,
the family. "Law" or "the legal system," on the other hand, is a
distinctly secondary body of phenomena. It is a specialized realm of
state and professional activity that is called into being by the pri-
mary social world in order to serve that world's needs. Law is auxil-
iary-an excrescence on social life, even if sometimes a useful
excrescence.
Though law and society are separate, they are related. And the
big theoretical problem for writers who see the world this way is to
work out the secret of that relationship. Thus, they ask questions
such as, "Is law a dependent or independent variable?" "Is every-
thing about law-norms, rules, processes, and institutions--deter-
mined by society, or does law have "autonomous" internal structures
or logic?" "If it has internal structures, do they enable it to have an
independent causal effect-to act as a positive feedback loop-on
social life?" Writers in the liberal tradition (like those in the Marxist
laziness than out of the expectation that the readers and writers of mainstream legal scholar-
ship will simply recognize the propositions as belonging to the ordinary, taken-for-granted,
common sense-of that scholarship. To supplement this method of recognition, I actually did
try in another article to give concrete examples of writers who accepted this set of views. See
Gordon, Hsisoricism in Legal Scholarship., 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1028-45 (1981) (the dominant
vision was there called "adaptation theory" and more sketchily described than it is here).
And in this article I try to provide many more examples at appropriate points.
As for readers who do recognize their own views in my list of the core propositions of the
dominant vision but think my account unacceptably reduces, caricatures, or distorts those
views, I propose the following procedure: (1) Consider whether the view you want to defend
is more accurately categorized as part of the "dominant vision" or as one of the numerous
"critiques" of that vision that appear later in this article (it may be that you are really a critic,
rather than an adherent, of evolutionary functionalism as I've described it); (2) if after doing
that you still find yourself a defender of evolutionary functionalism, but of a far more refined
and subtle variety than my caricature, ask yourself whether your variant is or is not vulnera-
ble to the many critiques (it may be that the critiques are as good against the sophisticated as
against the crude versions); and finally (3) if you have isolated a strain of the dominant vision
that you believe to be immune to the critiques (or, naturally, if you think the critiques are all
garbage anyway), write a letter or publish an article in response to this one.
[Vol. 36:57
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tradition) have resolved these questions in wildly different ways and
reached wildly different conclusions,9 but they all assume that these
are the vital questions.
2. Societies have needs.
This proposition is the functionalist heart of the dominant vi-
sion.1" Social needs may be universal-needs such as survival, stabil-
ity, maintenance of social order, conflict management, organization
of production, security against foreign enemies, allocation of scarce
resources, or preservation of continuity in the midst of change-or
they may be specific to a given stage of social or economic develop-
ment. One key need is the need to develop along the appropriate social
evolutionary path.
Needs operate both as pressures and as constraints. They are the
motors driving the society to find means for their fulfillment, and
they set the limits on the possibilities of social experimentation-lim-
its beyond which lie dysfunction, futility, failure, and chaos.1"
3. There is an objective, determined, progressive social evolutionay
path.
The general idea here is that the causal responsibility for change
lies with impersonal forces of historical "becoming." More specifi-
cally, the histories of certain advanced Western societies, most nota-
bly the United States, describe an evolutionary development that is
9. See notes 18-26 infra and accompanying text.
10. This proposition is probably also the single most disputed one within liberal legal
scholarship: Many writers see the attribution of "needs" to societies as excessively reifying,
and they therefore try to break societies down into their constituent individuals or interest
groups. See text accompanying note 38 in/ja.
11. For the purposes of this article, I'm reserving the term "functionalism" for the par-
ticular type of explanation outlined here, i.e., one that first posits a set of "primary," more-or-
less objective needs or dynamic processes and then explains "secondary" historical phenom-
ena as responses to those needs or processes.
Some legal writers seem to use "functionalism" in a sense different from mine, to mean
any way of explaining legal forms or practices by reference to social "purposes" or "inter-
ests"-indeed by reference to anything other than the formal, internal materials of the legal
system. This usage seems to me both too broad and too narrow. It's too broad because any
practice is "functional," and none dysfunctional, if that means it serves somebody's interest or
can be seen as part of a system or pattern or process. And it's too narrow because it arbitrar-
ily excludes attempts to show how the "function" of a legal practice might be to meet the
formal requirements of (i.e., serve someone's "ideal interest" in) the elegance or completeness
of an abstract system. I'd prefer to call this general type of explanation "external" or "con-
textual" and to label as "instrumental" the particular subset of external explanations that
account for legal practices as products of the desires or demands of social classes, groups, or
individuals.
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both natural (in the sense that some version of it will happen in every
society unless "artificial" constraints force a deviation) and, on the
whole, progressive.
Different generations have described this evolutionary process
somewhat differently, but the contemporary United States almost al-
ways ends up sitting at the developmental summit. The great eight-
eenth and nineteenth-century story (the "Scottish Enlightenment"
story' 2 whose general outlines are still so firmly rooted in our culture)
told of the gradual liberation of the individual from the shackles of
feudalism and superstition-from restraints on trade, on free aliena-
tion of land, and on free movement of labor; from the oppressions of
feudal dues and tithes and of perpetual subordination to customary
hierarchies of ecclesiastical and noble orders; and from established
religions. According to this story, the concurrent spread of liberty
and commerce yielded a commonwealth of men who were actually or
potentially (with some exceptions such as slaves) politically equal
property-holders, securely owning and freely exchanging land, labor,
and capital.'
3
By the start of our own century, the growth of propertyless classes
caused the historians' emphasis to shift away from the concept of
progress as the growth of yeoman freeholders and towards the con-
cept of progress as improvement in technology, organization of pro-
duction, and creation of opportunities for immigrants to rise in
society. In our own age of dampened enthusiasms, the labels at-
tached to basic historical changes tend to be more neutral: "industri-
alization," "modernization," or just "political and economic
development." In usage, however, these labels retain a strong norma-
tive flavor and occasionally, as in some legal economists' interpreta-
tion of the history of societies as one long series of "efficiency"
gains,' 4 an unabashed Victorian optimism.
What all these histories have in common is their determinist tele-
12. See J. BURROW, A LIBERAL DESCENT: VICTORIAN HISTORIANS AND THE ENGLISH
PAST 21-35 (1981); A. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGI*-
MENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 81-93 (1977).
13. The story was always ambiguous as to whether an ideal element (the love of liberty)
or a material one (extension of the market) was the driving force behind this liberation.
14. One can take as an example the following statement:
The efficient society is wealthier than the inefficient-that is what efficiency
means-and a wealthier society will support a larger population. This effect of
greater wealth can be decisive in the competition among primitive societies, where
the methods of warfare are simple and numbers of people count for much more than
in modern warfare. Archaic societies sufficiently durable to have left substantial
literary or archaeological remains and primitive societies sufficiently durable to
[Vol. 36:57
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ologies, whose elemental parts-the "extension of the market," the
"breakdown of traditional communities and status hierarchies," the
"shift from ascribed to achieved social status," the "triumph of the
middle class," the "revolution of production in the factory system,"
the "rise of the administrative state," and the "development of the
multi-divisional form of corporate organization"-are all linked to-
gether in a masterprocess of social evolution.' 5
Lawyers once played a moderately important role in actually
writing these histories. Recent legal writing is more likely just to as-
sume that some objective, generally understood process of develop-
ment has been working away in the background, and to leave the
actual details of the process to vague implication.
4. Legal systems should be described and explained in terns of their
functional responsiveness to social needs.
Functionalist sociological legal history has an exceedingly distin-
guished lineage, beginning with Montesquieu and Adam Smith, con-
tinuing through Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Rudolph von Jhering,
and virtually all lesser nineteenth-century writers on law, 6 and in-
cluding among twentieth-century lawyers such figures as Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, Karl Llewellyn, Franz Neumann,
have survived into the nineteenth century (when serious anthropological study be-
gan) are likely, therefore, to be societies whose customs are efficient.
Clearly, however, the primitive social equilibrium is less efficient, at least in the
long run, than that of advanced societies: consider the very small proportion of the
world's population that lives in primitive societies today. This situation is due in
some part to coercion, rather than peaceful competition, from the advanced societies
(dramatically so in the case of the North American Indians, for example), but in
greater part to the adaptive responses of primitive society to its economic environ-
rnent. These responses include practices, such as denying people privacy and
preventing them from amassing wealth, which are inimical to economic progress
and in turn to population growth. This is a point to give the romantic anarchist
pause.
Posner, A Theop ofPnmtre Socieqy, With Special Reference to Law, 23 J. L. & EcoN. 1, 53 (1980).
I suppose that if Society A invents the Maxim gun, which it uses to massacre the natives
of Society B, or develops an immunity to its own virulent venereal diseases, which then spread
among and wipe out the population of Society B, we could say that Society A is more "effi-
cient." Other adjectives also come to mind.
15. It was of course not a lawyer, but the sociologist Talcott Parsons. who produced the
Summa of modern accounts of this integrated process. See, e.g., T. PARSONS & N. SMEL.SM.R,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: A STUDY IN THE INTEGRATION OF ECONOMIic AND SOCIAL THE-
ORY 284-94 (1956). Yet something like the Parsonian account is remarkably pervasive in
modem legal scholarship though its optimism is occasionally qualified with a trace of tragic
modernism.
16. See, e.g., P. STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA 122-27 (1980).
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and Willard Hurst. The general functionalist method is to construct
(or, as is rather more common, to assume without much discussion) a
typology of stages of social development and then to show how legal
forms and institutions have satisfied, or failed to satisfy, the func-
tional requirements of each stage. Obviously, an enormous gap in
sophistication and conceptual power separates the best and worst ex-
amples of this method. At its best, as in Weber's work, complex bun-
dles of rules are tied through explicit theorizing to elaborate accounts
of social development. At its comically vulgar worst, the method
produces wholly speculative functional rationales for legal rules in
underlying social changes-vacuously described rationales such as
"the evolution of the right of privacy was a response to the increasing
complexity and interdependence of modern society."' 7
Of all the generalizations produced by this method, one so famil-
iar that it has become a clich6 of our common discourse is that capi-
talist development (or as our forebears preferred to put it, the
expansion of commerce) requires legal improvements that increase
the certainty and .predictability of exchange relationships. I will
come back to this assertion, but I should first list the final identifying
characteristic of the dominant vision, namely:
5. The legal system adapts to changing social needs.
This concept expresses the confidence that, in the advanced West-
ern nations and especially in the United States, the legal system has in
fact responded to evolving social needs. Save for egregiously Panglos-
sian writers (Blackstone in some moods is one of these), the propo-
nents of this notion do not feel a need to attribute a social function to
every piece of law in the system; most writers will concede that even
major legal forms and processes can be dysfunctional for short peri-
ods. But a committed functionalist will maintain that, despite unde-
niable instances of lag and reaction, adaptation is the normal course.
The perspective thus tends to produce statements such as the follow-
ing (presented here for the sake of illustration in their simplest and
most unqualified form), which discuss specific changes in legal rules
or forms:
-Tort law rules such as the negligence standard and the fellow-
servant rule were adopted to meet the needs of early industrial devel-
opment. (They allowed employers and transportation entrepreneurs
to externalize a portion of their costs.) But as technological change
17. For a marvelous collection of examples, see Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293
(1984); see also notes 53-60 infra and accompanying text.
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increased the risks of accidents stemming from employment and from
the use of consumer goods, the law responded with rules of strict
liability.
-Warranty rules such as "caveat emptor" reflected a society in
which most commercial trading was face-to-face. But with the rise of
mass consumer transactions between remote sellers and purchasers
and with increasing ignorance about the risks of defects, the law im-
plied warranties of merchantability.
-The corporate form developed in order to fulfill the need for
capital accumulation during the period of industrial take-off.
-Various features of modern corporate organization, including
the "business judgment" rule and the rules specifying areas of man-
agement "prerogative" exempt from collective bargaining, developed
in order to give management broad discretionary decisionmaking
power necessary for efficient maximization of profits in advanced in-
dustrial societies.
-Courts and legislatures were competent to handle the problems
of regulating the early nineteenth-century economy of competitive
individuals. By the late nineteenth century, however, the concentra-
tion of corporate enterprise was raising problems of such complexity
that administrative agencies were required to handle them.
-Professionalization of the bar-the development of bar associa-
tions, law schools, formalized training and entry requirements, the
large urban law office, etc.-was necessary to enable lawyers to take
on the complex specialized tasks of law in a modern economy.
This perspective also produces some very large claims indeed.
The first two examples listed below were commonplace in legal rhet-
oric through the end of the last century; the third is asserted by some
lawyer-economists in our own time:
-The common law over time tends to work itself pure.
-Progressive improvements in legal science have tended to clar-
ify legal doctrine, making it ever more certain and predictable, as
well as more adaptable to social needs.
-Common law rules have tended to become more and more
efficient.
B. Divisions Within Functionalism
By now it will be evident that my "dominant tradition" is a very
broad umbrella, covering legal writers whose views on many issues
differ radically, some of whom would be appalled to find themselves
January 1984]
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sharing even a limited-purpose category with the others. In particu-
lar, I mean to group under the common shelter of "evolutionary
functionalism" both of the great antagonistic parties of modern
American legal thought, labelled here for simplicity's sake "Formal-
ism" and "Realism." Each of these parties has, I think, worked out
contrasting visions of what social development consists of and how
law has adapted to that development without disturbing the funda-
mental assumption of progressive adaptation that they hold in com-
mon. The parties have clashed instead over such issues as the
definition of law and the autonomy of legal decisionmaking."8
The Formalist side has a very restrictive notion of law as judge-
made law: "The legal system is the domain of the legal specialist; the
legislature is in general not part of the legal system but a source of
the goals that the legal system is to carry out."' 9 Legislation and
usually administration as well are thus relegated to the "social"
sphere of the great law/society dichotomy. On the Realist side, how-
ever, law is "what officials do about disputes,'"20 or even more
broadly, the work of anyone, including the private bar, whose task is
the administration of public policy.
Formalists and Realists also divide over the issue of the "auton-
omy" of legal decisionmaking processes in relation to political, social,
and economic decisionmaking. Formalists think that it is both usual
and desirable for legal decisions to follow an internal professional
agenda such as "a taught legal tradition"'" of the common law. The
idea is that such decisions will best perform their social/functional
task of adaptation if lawyers and judges are not thinking about soci-
ety at all but only about perfecting their own craft, because a logic of
liberty or efficiency is inherent in the practice of that craft. Realists
think that this proposition is nonsense, that policymaking can't be
socially functional unless it is self-consciously directed towards the
satisfaction of social needs. Realists do, however, have their own no-
18. Incidentally, the fact that legal Formalism has been politically conservative and
Legal Realism more liberal-reformist is only an accident of our recent history. It is easy to
imagine a radical formalism, such as the French Revolution's program to remake society in
accordance with abstract legal rights, or a conservative Realism, such as German historicism.
19. R. MEANS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW: CORPORA-
TIONS AND CORPORATION LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY COLUMBIA xii (1980) (footnote
omitted). This book is an exemplary performance in the functionalist/evolutionist mode of
legal history (lacking, however, the normative notions of progress common to that mode).
20. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 20 (1951). For
a clear idea of what Llewellyn meant by this famous phrase, see W. TWINING, KARL LLEWEL-
LYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 148-52 (1973).
21. R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LUw 82 (1978).
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tion of legal "autonomy": Policymakers ought to be, and sometimes
actually are, insulated from the immediate pressures of short-term
political or economic interests so they can concentrate on their soci-
ety's long-run needs.22
These differences lead to differing Formalist and Realist ap-
proaches to legal history. Formalist legal history focuses exclusively
on the development of legal doctrine, while Realist legal history con-
siders doctrine as one component of a general, if not always well-
coordinated, policymaking enterprise.3 Further, formalist legal his-
tory considers phenomena outside the legal craft as distorting judicial
decisionmaking or as simply irrelevant to the important story to be
told; the Formalist hero is the judge or treatise-writer who best clari-
fies doctrinal categories. Realist history, on the other hand, takes as
its main subject the relations of function or dysfunction between law
and major trends of social development; the Realist hero is the social
engineer who masterfully wields law as an instrument of policy.
24
Naturally these differences lead to fundamental disagreements
about the course of recent history. For many Formalists, the high
point of legal development was reached around the end of the nine-
teenth century when the ideal of the rule of law as primarily enforced
by judges through an autonomous legal order was at its peak of influ-
ence.25 But the Formalists' high is the Realists' low: At that time,
abstraction from concrete social forces had put the legal system badly
out of synch with the evolving requirements of society, and we only
climbed out of this trough of dysfunction through the implementa-
tion of the policies of Progressivism and the New Deal. 6
II. INTERLUDE FOR QUESTIONS ABOUT THE POINT OF THIS
PROJECT
Before going on to say something about the attacks that have
been eating away at the evolutionary-functionalist vision of legal his-
.tory, it is worth pausing a moment to ask why anyone should bother
22. See, e.g., J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 111-17 (1938) (discussing why
agencies were organized so as to insulate them from the administration that appointed agency
officials).
23. See, e.g., W. HURST, THE GROVTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE L,% MAKERS 439-46
(1950) (adopting a broad view of law and of the tasks of legal history).
24. See, e.g., Hurst, Alexander Hamilton, Law Maker, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 483 (1978).
25. See generally 1 F. HAYEK, LAwV, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: RL LES AND ORDER
94-123 (1973).
26. See, e.g., W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY UNITED STATES 84-108 (1956).
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to attack the vision at all. Social scientists who have heard previous
versions of this piece wonder why I worry so much about evolution-
ism (our dominant vision's points 3 and 5) and functionalism (2 and
4), the mainstays of the liberal sociology of the 1950's; these views
have been so thoroughly discredited in modern social theory, they
argue, as to be left almost without serious defenders. On the other
hand, some of my legal colleagues, who have spent their working
lives trying to slay the Formalist hydra that is still powerfully present
in legal-academic and professional thought generally, think it per-
verse and ungrateful to attack the Realist versions of functionalism.
for these versions have proven to be the most reliable weapons
against the dogma that legal forms can be understood apart from
their social context: If the weapons are broken, won't the hydra stalk
the law schools unafraid?
To the first question, the second is itself a partial answer: Evolu-
tionary functionalism, in both the Formalist and Realist versions, has
been kept going much longer in legal thought than in social thought
generally. This isn't only because the law schools tend to pick up
mainstream intellectual opinion ten to fifteen years late. The notion
that law always is, or at least ought to be, functionally adapting to
evolving social needs is so deeply embedded in standard legal speech
that one isn't likely to make a legal argument of any length without
at least mentioning it. This notion presumably persists because of its
serviceability to the liberal idea of law as the neutral arbiter of social
conflict: It tells the managers of the legal system that their basic in-
structions are specified by a social process outside of the legal system
and that they have no responsibility for that process except to solve
the technical problems of devising functional responses that will help
rather than hinder it. Hence, the inevitable ambiguities of legislative
command, prior case law, custom, or constitutional text need never
force a legal system to the pain of political choice because its manag-
ers can always claim to be serving the logic of an historical process or
immanent social consensus that exists beyond and prior to politics.
2 7
27. For example, dominant visionaries argue that in "'modern" or "developed" societies.
innovations in technology and the organization of the work force are continually expanding
the size of the total economic pie. Political conflict properly takes place only over issues of
secondary importance, such as how the pie is to be divided; expansion is both the natural
course of development for a modern society and something that is in everyone's interest. The
job of the legal system, absent (evidently misguided) authoritative political directions to the
contrary, is to facilitate the needs of the production process (e.g., "efficient management."
"industrial peace"), which by definition are universal needs rather than those of a particular
faction or class. See, for a fuller description of this example, Stone, The Post- Wzr Paradigm in
American Labor Law, 90 YALE LJ. 1509, 1545 (1981).
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What's more, not only is evolutionary functionalism still a living
force in traditional legal argument, it has in recent years received a
terrific hormone boost from some of the fanciest and most interesting
new work coming out of the law schools: the Chicago law and eco-
nomics movement,2 Williamson's "transaction cost" approach to le-
gal institutions,29 Bob Clark's explicitly evolutionary approach to the
history of the modern corporation,3" and Selznick and Nonet's theory
of "responsive law."31
Perhaps by now the second question, "Why knock functionalism
when it's been so good to you?," is on its way to being answered.
Realist functionalism has unquestionably been a politically progres-
sive and intellectually liberating force; it has moved us away from
the occasionally useful but ultimately sterile studies of technical
forms evolving in a cultural vacuum and from the idea that lawyers
and judges will always and automatically do the most possible good
through complacent inattention to the society in which they live. Its
empirical investigations of the law "in action" have exploded forever
the Formalist fantasy that a universal scheme of neutral, general
rules controls equally and impersonally the discretion of every class
and faction of civil society. We owe to the Realist tradition of schol-
arship most of our understanding of variations in the effectiveness of
law according to the power and wealth of the people it touches or
who seek to use it, of "legal pluralism" (the fact that real social life is
prodigal of sovereigns-different governments, officials at different
levels of government, "private" associations-each making its own
brand of law in cooperation or competition with the others), and of
the complexity and perversity of legal/social relations (how it so
often happens that a legal form seemingly designed to strengthen A's
at the expense of B's ends up wiping out A's and entrenching B's
more immovably than ever). So much indeed have the Realist func-
tionalists accomplished that it's hard not to sympathize with their
resentment of Critics who seem to be trying to displace them just as
28. See, e.g., Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of EAaint R&es, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 65 (1977); see also Goodman, An Economic Theon , of the E'olution ofj Cmmon Law, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978): Rubin, Why As the Common Law Efftzent?. 6 .J LEGAL STUD. 51
(1977); Terrebone, A Strictly, Et,olutzonar,.$odel of Commo, Law. 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 397 (1981).
29. See 0. WILLL-.MSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES" ANALYSIS %Ni ANTITRUST IM-
PLICATIONS (1975).
30. See Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflctow on Iniestmem Management Treatises, 94
HARv. L. REv. 561 (1981); Clark, The Interdiseiphna0 Stu4 qf Legal Ev'olution, 90 YALE L.J.
1238 (1981).
31. See, e.g., P. SELZNICK & P. NONET, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOwRD
RESPONSIVE LAW (1978).
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Law-and-Society studies are beginning to make a dent on the main-
stream lawyers who, until recently, showed little more than scorn for
Realist empiricism. "Must we always," the empiricists ask despair-
ingly, "be patronized by lawyers with fancy theories in their heads
and no respect for facts? Might not our movement be allowed its
dialectical moment of supremacy before the tides of Critical negativ-
ity drag it away?"
3 2
The Critics can give this cri de coeur a straightforward answer:
Any intelligent Critical approach will make use of the insights and
empirical findings of Realist functionalism,33 but there are apologetic
aspects even to the Realist versions of the dominant vision that the
Critics feel compelled to resist. For example, by emphasizing law as
policy, Realist functionalism almost unconsciously reserves even
what it believes to be the very marginal opportunities for legal influ-
ence on the direction of social change to an elite of policymakers:
Mass movements and local struggles are not ordinarily thought of as
makers of legal change. 34 Because it assumes a natural harmony of
interests in the fulfillment of social needs, it has trouble seeing con-
flict as other than dysfunctional disturbance of equilibrium. And,
with all regard for its heroic contributions, I believe its essential
working assumptions misleadingly objectify history, making highly
contingent developments appear to have been necessary.
The Critics' basic argument-elaborated more fully below-is
that by taking the world as we know it as largely determined by im-
personal social forces, evolutionary-functionalists obscure the ways in
which these seemingly inevitable processes are actually manufac-
tured by people who claim (and believe themselves) to be only pas-
sively adapting to such processes.35 If there are evolutionary
32. Trubek, Critical Legal Studies and Empir~ism, 36 STAN. L. REx'. 575 (1984) is an espe-
cially useful statement of the differences, both real and supposed, between GLS and the Law-
and-Society movement.
33. I give examples of such uses at text accompanying notes 61-71 infra.
34. How ironic it is that the country whose People, by their official ideology, have dele-
gated only limited powers to their State; whose political origins lie in revolutionary protests
organized by "the people out of doors," crowds explicitly claiming legal status and legiti-
macy: and whose history is so full of mass reform movements should have produced such a
Tory legal literature, narrowly focused on official agencies, especially the courts, and almost
completely indifferent to extra-institutional law-making. On the different conceptions of re-
form "'within" and "outside" the "system" informing liberal and Critical thought. see Simon,
1tsons of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REx. 469 (1984).
35. For example, the functionalist lawyers who helped to design the ground rules regu-
lating labor-capital conflict after World War II assumed that the expansion of the total eco-
nomic pie (which was in everyone's interest) required unconstrained management discretion
over investment decisions and general working conditions, leaving to resolution through col-
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processes in social life, they are processes whose logic is one of multi-
plicity, not uniformity of forms. The social nature of human beings
reveals itself not through constant responses to their environments
but through an astonishing diversity of cultural responses and, most
remarkable of all, a repeatedly demonstrated capacity to reimagine
their situations so as to generate novel responses still.3 6 We invent
shorthand labels like "modernization" as a way of summarizing what
has happened in and trying to generalize about the history of partic-
ular societies. Then, by a trick of the mind, we suddenly reify our
label into a process that had to happen the way it did. The next thing
you know, we start explaining the whole contingent miscellany of
contemporary social practices (especially the nasty ones) as the natu-
ral outcome of the "modernization process." But if there is no such
single process, there can't be any single set of functional responses to
it either. Surely there are other ways of thinking about history that
don't trap us into supposing we're permanently stuck with what we
happen to be used to, with only the tiniest margins for maneuvering.
The hope of getting out of that trap and of exploring the alternatives
is what fuels the enterprise of criticizing the dominant vision.
III. PARTIAL CRITIQUES: VARIATIONS ON THE DOMINANT
THEME
I call the sample of views that follow "partial" critiques because
they remain faithful to many elements of the dominant vision while
rejecting others. These critiques come from all colors of the political
spectrum.
A. Variation # I.- Collapse "Needs" into "Interests"
This move is so common that it could be called a subtheme rather
lective bargaining only the residual issue of how to divide the resulting surplus. Critical his-
torians treat this more or less unexamined background assumption of a relationship of social
necessity (efficient production requires legal forms preserving managerial prerogatives) as an
ideological practice that helped to produce social necessity because it suppressed alternative
methods of governing production as unthinkable or unrealistic. Thus, in company with many
other social actors, lawyers were more or less unwittingly reproducing the world they were
used to-actually helping to create what they imagined to be the given, pre-existing "hard
social reality" of the situation-because they were trapped in a functionalist logic that told
them the basic conditions of the production process had to remain much as they already were.
36. See S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 324-34 (1981) (what is biologically de-
termined is a brain capable of creative variation in its cultural environment); Geertz, The
Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man, in C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES (1973) (the human species realizes its "nature" not through uniformity but diver-
sity of cultural forms).
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than a variation of the dominant view. It consists simply of breaking
down the universal category of societal needs into the particular con-
flicting desires or interests of society's members. The function of law
then becomes that of responding to some balance of those interests.
This variation has an interesting history of appearances in mod-
ern legal scholarship. Towards the beginning of this century, a
writer who identified the factional pressures behind the the creation
of a legal form was usually describing either an abnormal and regret-
table situation or one that had happened a comfortably long time
before. Explaining the political and economic origins of old law was
all right so long as you made clear that recent law had developed
independently of all pressures save the "taught tradition" of the pro-
fession. If you did attribute a class or special-interest origin to con-
temporary law, you did so in order to condemn it. Thus, legal
conservatives condemned wages-and-hours laws as "class legislation,"
and Progressives condemned judicial invalidation of such laws as
caving in to the Interests at the expense of the People.
But with time-and growing disillusionment with the regulatory
welfare state, one could hear more scholars, of whom perhaps the
most influential were Lawrence Friedman and Gabriel Kolko, ex-
plaining not just bad law but all law as the product of interest-group
pressures.3 7 These writers were soon joined by the Chicago-school
economists, the sires of the modern law and economics movement, in
rapidly increasing numbers. And if today you hear a voice claiming
that a legal rule was adopted because its adoption served the interest
of some regulated industry, or that a complex procedure exists only
because it makes money for the legal profession-explanations of a
kind once despised by mainstream lawyers as the paranoid cynicism
of Populist and Marxist vulgarsateurs-the voice as likely as not be-
longs to a right-wing economist.
There are several different ways of characterizing the interests
that law tries to satisfy. Right-wing economism says that interests
37. ,5ee, e.g.. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LA-, (1973); G. KOLKO, THE
TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916
(1963).
38. See, e.g., Pashigian, Regu/ation, Preventive Law and the Duties of Atorneys, in THE
CHANGING ROLE OF THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY 3 (WN. Carney ed. 1982); Stigler, The Theog "
of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON: & MGMT. Sc!. 3 (1971). The economist can afford this
kind of candor about political pressures on law because he's got the suprapolitical norm of
"efficiency" to fall back on. The left-wing writer, on the other hand, is much more likely to
argue that the legal system is "relatively autonomous," not completely to be explained by this
sort of influence. See notes 86-88 in/ra and accompanying text.
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are just the arbitrary desires of individual subjects, revealed through
crude behavioral proxies such as "willingness to pay" or votes. This
school has no theory at all of how such desires originate, except per-
haps a vague notion that people in a given occupational or institu-
tional role will want to maximize the interest the theorist casually
attributes to that role.3 9 Centrist-liberal pluralism discovers what in-
terests are by looking at the programs of organized groups and
largely explains legal enactments as compromises among those inter-
ests. While this view is certainly a big advance over the view of soci-
ety as isolated individuals or roles, its mainstream forms have been
famously vulnerable to the charge of lacking any plausible account of
power or social structure that would help explain why some groups
get their way more than others.or why some groups never get to be
"interests" at all because they can't organize.40 Finally, various
economisms, not all on the left, do pay attention to power and social
structure and explain law as the instrument of ruling groups. These
last merit their own subheading and are treated under Variation # 2.
But before going on to the rest of the Variations, it's worth paus-
ing to ask if this first one, the reduction of needs to interests, repre-
sents an intellectual advance over the dominant vision. In some ways
it clearly does: By assuming that conflict is a normal feature of social
interaction, this view focuses attention on the distributional struggles
underlying legal enactment and implementation and helps to iden-
tify who wins and who loses from different regimes of law. It also
encourages descriptions of law-in-society that are populated with in-
dividuals and groups with aspirations and strategies and that are
thus more concrete than the frequently vague allusions to the imper-
sonal background forces of development that serve as the primary
motors of change in the dominant tradition. After long immersion in
writing that grounds legal change in the ghostly pressures of evolving
doctrines or in such causes as "increasing social complexity and inter-
dependence," one feels an amazed and delighted gratitude at coming
across an account that tells you that some piece of law took the form
it did because a shipper's lobby, or homesteaders, or a coal company,
or a Senate committee chairman wanted it to.
Almost needless to say, such accounts are often fatal to the nor-
39. For example, stockholders "want" profit on their investment and easy exit; workers
"want" higher wages and benefits; neither "wants" a stake in management of the enterprise.
40. See Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theo---and its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223
(1981).
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mative element in legal histories.41 Yet the switch from needs to in-
terests is by no means all gain. For all its problems, the functionalist
perspective recognizes that societies have to be understood as systems
and structures, not just as a series of collisions among the preferences
and strategies of their constituent members: All these people partici-
pate in and are constrained by structures of discourse, ways of think-
ing about reality and right, cultural inheritance, and political and
organizational forms that shape desire and channel its expression.
The subtler exponents of "instrumental" theories of law (as this Vari-
ation's theories are commonly called) have always recognized this.
The more reductionist exponents, principally the economists, seem to
think that one is puncturing all the vagueness involved in reifying
" society" into a thing with "needs" by getting down to the nitty-
gritty reality of concrete individuals and groups. But the "interest
groups" of pluralist theory and the "individuals" of economic theory
are no less reified and no more real entities than is the "society" of
functionalists; they are just as much products of socially created and
maintained categqries of thought and conventional practices.
B. Variation #2-Transpose "'Needs" into "Domination"
In other words, every time a mainstream writer says a legal rule
or process or institution serves the needs of society, show instead how
it serves to maintain the power of a dominant class or group. Oppo-
nents of this variation are inclined to call it "Marxist," although the
classical Marxist theory of law is just one highly specific subset of this
variation.42 In reality, this general proposition would be adopted as
well by many non-Marxists: by elite theorists, including conserva-
tives like Alexander Hamilton, who think the ruling classes ought to
control the legal system, and by fatalists, who think that for good or
ill elites will always be in control and indeed that having control of
41. But not necessarily. It's quite possible, and indeed frequently happens, that a legal
writer may combine an interest-group perspective with a functionalist one. The writer could
argue, for instance, that needs appearing at some stage of historical development generate
interests to assert those needs; the legal system then responds to those interests. Alternatively,
the writer could take the view that the "market" for law-responsive-to-the-demands-of-inter-
ests tends toward a long-run equilibrium; and this view could (though it need not) be a nor-
mative one such as that of interest-group pluralism, in which the primary if not exclusive
virtue of a legal system consists in its responsiveness to such demands.
42. The classical Marxist theory closely resembles the dominant liberal vision in that it
holds legal institutions to be functionally responsive to the needs of the basic modes of pro-
duction which define successive stages of a macrohistorical evolutionary process. For a useful
summary account of the theory, see G. McLENNAN, supra note 4, at 3-23, 45-65.
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the legal system is one of the things that helps identify those elites.43
On the other hand, modern marxisant theorists of law and the state, as
well as most Critical Legal Studies people, have become so dis-
enchanted with the project of trying to explain law as nothing more
than the tool of the ruling class that their ideas can't be adequately
treated under this subheading.
The great contribution of this variation has been to put social
structure, class, and power-whose very existence much liberal legal
writing seems so astonishingly to deny-back into our accounts of
law. Histories of legal oppressions-of slavery, Indian Removal laws,
Black Codes, labor injunctions-are indispensable reminders that
there's often nothing subtle about the way the powerful deploy the
legal system to keep themselves organized and their victims disorga-
nized and scared.' But the crude versions of the law-as-an-elite-tool
theory are as vulnerable as mainstream functionalism to the critique
which points out how incredibly difficult it is to relate events in the
realm of "law" in any straightforward causal way to those in the
realm of "society."
C. Variation #3--Weaken the Instrumental Links Between Law and
Society
Instrumentalist theories of law-which here include mainstream
functionalism as well as the right-wing economics of Variation # 1
and the orthodox Marxism of Variation #2-generally aspire to a
positivist style of explanation. The idea is that someday (that Jubilee
when all the data have been gathered in) we will be able to genera-
lize convincingly and fairly abstractly about what social conditions
will produce what legal responses and what effects upon society those
responses will have in their turn. Yet I think it's fair to say that on
the whole such statements of regularity in legal-social relations don't
stand up very well to historical criticism.45 These statements keep
43. See, e.g., G. MOSCA, THE RULING CLASS 130-34, 409-10 (1939).
44. An especially fine and subtle work in this genre is J. GAVENTA, POWER AND
POWERLESSNESS (1980) (describing use of terror, intimidation, control of the media, and ma-
nipulation of the legal and political processes in employers' campaign against striking Appa-
lachian mineworkers).
45. This is a rather large assertion, for which thorough documentation would require
combing mainstream legal scholarship for propositions suggesting functional linkages be-
tween legal forms and material conditions and then trying to show what was wrong with
every such proposition. What I've done here instead is to pick out some commonplace exam-
ples of such propositions, all of them backed by respectable sponsors, in the supposition that
they are representative samples of the whole bulk. Readers who think the examples are un-
fairly chosen are urged to produce better ones.
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running up against (a) comparative studies showing that social and
economic conditions that are apparently similar in relevant respects
46
have actually produced radically different legal responses and (b)
demonstrations that the social effects of adopting a legal form are
never predictable from the form itself, because the interpretation of a
form, its enforcement by lower-level officials, and the response it's
likely to elicit (enthusiasm, indifference, resistance) may all vary with
the minutest particulars of context. 7
Take, for example, the once familiar proposition that the negli-
gence principle was a functional response to the social needs of indus-
trialization in its earlier phases (because it protected infant industry
by externalizing its costs onto farmers, workers, city residents, etc.).
The problems with this proposition are that (a) lots of societies indus-
trialized without the negligence principle or after the principle had
been around so long that it could hardly be a "response" to industri-
alization,48 and (b) the fact that there was a "negligence principle"
doesn't by itself imply any determinate set of social consequences be-
cause the principle can be interpreted (or ignored) by judges, admin-
istrators, jurors, or employers so as to produce any imaginable
combination of liability and damages (including none of either).49
46. Of course one could argue that situations are never similar enough in type to afford
a basis for such comparisons, but so strong a form of historicism would doom forever the
possibility of a historical sociology of law along functionalist lines.
47. I should stress here that the most valuable criticism of this type has not come from
radical critics, nor from CLS people, but from within mainstream liberal scholarship itself-
from (a) functionalist social theorists such as Weber, who conscientiously raise difficulties with
their own positions; (b) legal historians such as Scheiber and Hurst, who seem to have a
general commitment to the notion that law responds to social needs, but whose particular
narratives undercut any strong version of functionalism by revealing how various the re-
sponses have been; (c) legal historians who tend to explain law as the product of interest-
group conflict, especially Friedman, who has always emphasized how many different tech-
niques, legal or nonlegal, can serve an economic function and refused to give any legal form a
position of causal necessity. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 234 ("It is doubtful that
majestic capitalism would have smothered in its crib without the rule of caeat emptor. It is
doubtful whether specific doctrines of commercial law were cause, effect, or condition of
American capitalism; or all or none of these." (footnote omitted)); (d) institutional-economic
historians, such as those cited infia note 62, who have done comparative work on the role of
the state in promoting and regulating economic development; (e) the work of the law-and-
society movement on the "gap between law on the books and the law in action," stressing the
study of implementation of legal rules; and finally () the Legal Realists' critique of Formalist
conceptualism, stressing the dependency of textual meaning on context and convention.
48. See, e.g., Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15
GA. L. REv. 925 (1981); Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth Centu America: .4
Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981).
49. "There were and always are rules and counterrules, rules with exceptions of such
scope as to threaten the rule itself, rules whose force can be eliminated by drawing creatively
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These signs of indeterminacy naturally do not daunt the committed
functionalist; they only spur him on to more refined hypotheses that
will account for most of the variations. But in practice the progres-
sive refinement of general statements about causal relationships be-
tween legal and social forms tends rapidly to decompose such
statements into the detailed histories of particular societies. One's
brave and sweeping original hypothesis of the necessary relation be-
tween industrialization and a negligence standard of liability gets
boiled down to something like this: "In those places where the negli-
gence principle was recognized and routinely applied in a certain
way, it may have helped somewhat to facilitate capital accumula-
tion; in other places, where there seems to have been lots of capital
accumulation under different legal conditions, (a) some other form
served the same function as the negligence principle, or (b) for vari-
ous special reasons it wasn't necessary to the accumulation process to
have that function served, or (c) perhaps there would have been still
more accumulation if there had been a negligence principle."
There's nothing wrong with this modest sort of proposition; it's the
common stuff of historical writing. But it is an awfully long distance
from demonstrating that economic requirements produced the form
and that it duly performed its functional services to those
requirements.5 °
A Functionalist thus subdued can continue to argue for a scaled-
down determinism: the legal forms that actually emerged in a par-
ticular society were necessary to that society's particular require-
ments. Even if a negligence rule was not necessary for
industrialization, perhaps the fellow-servant rule, as administered to
workers on the railroads or just the Pennsylvania Railroad in the
1870's, was critical to that industry's ability to finance its expan-
sion.51 One can't disprove such an assertion. Because everything
on analogies to apparently unrelated areas of law, and so on." Tushnet, Book Review, 69
CORNELL L. REv. 281, 281 (1983).
50. Of course, lawyers or entrepreneurs of the time often believed that a given legal form
was an indispensable condition of material progress or social stability and pressed for its
adoption or retention because of that belief. But the historian who casts her project as that of
reconstructing such beliefs has abandoned functionalism entirely for the historiography of
legal ideology or consciousness. See Variation # 7 in/a.
51. R. FOGEL, RAILROADS AND ECONOMIc GROWTH (1964) is an extended
cliometrician's four dejorce purporting to demonstrate that the railroad ilsel was unnecessary to
nineteenth century economic growth. The thesis is violently controversial, but the arguments
in its favor are not trivial. And if a leading economic historian doubts the functional contri-
bution of the railroad, are lawyers, equipped with perhaps one percent of that historian's
technical sophistication and empirical data, likely to succeed in making the case for the func-
tional necessity of the fellow-servant rule?
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that has happened in history is causally connected to everything else,
there's no way to be sure that the connections were not forged by a
logic of necessity. Even actions that seem chosen or simply acciden-
tal may just look that way because we haven't yet discovered the
secret logic underlying them.52 Yet, without for a moment disputing
that the forms that industrial capitalism and the negligence principle
took in the nineteenth-century United States might be related, is the
evolutionary-functionalist hypothesis (law meets the needs of the de-
veloping economy) the most plausible means of relating these two
things? It is here that the comparative data revealing all the myriad
paths to capital accumulation and the legal-realist data revealing all
the myriad permutations that a legal form undergoes in practice
should at least make the functionalist hesitate.
Let me illustrate what I mean through what I mentioned earlier
as probably the most frequently asserted functionalist proposition
about law: the claim that various regimes of legal rules were neces-
sary or at least very useful to capitalist development because they
provided the certainty that facilitated rational calculation. The
strongest versions of this claim propose, for example, that the rules of
nineteenth-century contract law functionally responded to the need for
certainty: When commerce summoned loud, "Thou must!," contract
whispered low, "I can!" One hears this claim all the time,53 but it is
very difficult to sustain. Such evidence as we have suggests that trac-
ing the common law doctrines and institutions for enforcing con-
tracts to businessmen, those whom one might expect to be society's
preferred mouthpiece for voicing her needs, is very difficult. When
businessmen say what they want from an enforcement mechanism,
it's usually something along the lines of an arbitration process.54 To
be sure, the legal system may have been wiser than the businessmen
about their true needs: Lawyers undeniably thought so, as they liked
to promote their products-the common law of contracts, treatises,
52. Compare, for example, the hypothesis that both the negligence principle and the
organizational structures of industry were products of a common political/legal ideology that
liked to pretend that everything that happened in corporations was the product of voluntary
individual choice.
53. The claim most recently appeared in P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM
OF CONTRACT 420-24 (1979). This aspect of Atiyah's work is shrewdly criticized in Mensch,
Book Review, 33 STAN. L. REV. 752 (1981).
54. See, e.g., J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW: NONLEGAL DISP-rE SETTLEMENT
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 95-114 (1983); Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract L'tw, 30
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 829, 847-52 (1983); Ferguson, Legal Ideology and Commercial Interests: The
Social Origins of the Commercial Law Codes, 4 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y 18 (1977); Sugarman. supra
note *.
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Restatements, and commercial codifications-for their presumed
tendency to "increase the certainty and predictability" of commer-
cial transactions. Yet, in retrospect, the lawyers' goal of certainty ap-
pears to have been largely a legal fantasy. Formal rules framed in
juristic categories, such as "offer and acceptance" and "considera-
tion," that have no regard for the specific usages of real businesses are
not predictable. Nor are rules phrased in terms of general standards
of customary fairness, such as "reasonableness" and "good faith," so
as to incorporate those usages. And even if such rules were predict-
able, businessmen don't seem to pay much attention to them until
the (rare) prospect of litigation looms.55
Further, when one looks at the early nineteenth-century legal sys-
tem as a whole, rather than just at contract law, and to the system in
operation, rather than just its formal doctrinal expressions, can one
really say that this system made life more predictable for rational
capitalist planning? Sometimes, perhaps. Other times, surely not.
The law of that time, for example, rapidly divested a whole slew of
previously vested legal rights-rights to monopolize resources, to en-
join nuisances created by new industry, to collect compensation for
"indirect" property damage, and so forth.5 6 Should one therefore
say, "The legal system was a functional response to the capitalist
need to destabilize everyone's expectations, to put all property rights
at the risk of devastation from competition or from exposure to spil-
lovers from capitalist enterprise?" Early nineteenth-century govern-
ments also created commons out of large bundles of previously vested
55. See, e.g., Gordley, European Codes and American Restatements: Some Difatlties, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 140 (1981); Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business:. A Preliminay
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963); Gordon, Book Review, 36 VAND. L. REx. 431, 447-49
(1983).
Max Weber, who wrestled with these problems more than anyone else, never claimed
that lawyers, in creating these rules, were responding to the functional needs of capitalists. He
argued instead that lawvers were carrying out their project of legal rationalization for intel-
lectual and status reasons of their own and that the culmination of their project happily
coincided with the needs of capitalists for predictable rules. But the conscientious Weber had
to back away from even this less deterministic, more cautious and more convincing theory of
legal/social relations when he confronted the problem of England, a society with lots of capi-
talist development within an apparently woefully underrationalized legal system. This dis-
covery led him to reflect that perhaps the practical-minded, business-oriented lawyers of
England had devised a body of rules that was operationally more predictable than the highly
formal rule-schemes of the Continent. Yet if that were so, his main thesis about the calculabil-
ity of highly formal rule-schemes was itself thrown into doubt, as he himself acknowledged.
For exceptionally good treatments of these aspects of Weber's work, see A. KRONMAN. MAX
WEBER 118-25 (1983); Trubek, Max Weber and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 720.
56. See M. HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860, at 31-62
(1977).
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individual entitlements, insisting on the community's power to sub-
ject property to takings or regulations for public uses.57 Should one
thus say, "The legal system responds to the need to sacrifice individ-
ual expectations to capitalist needs for social overhead capital?" And
what if one takes a closer look at what lawyers actually did for their
commercial clients? One would find, it appears, that one of their
main jobs in their roles as debt-collectors was to mediate in bad times
between their creditor clients and the debtors, not pushing collection
to the limit but trying to reschedule and scale down debts in order to
keep everyone afloat until the upswing of the business cycle-in ef-
fect helping to redistribute losses among the whole trading commu-
nity. 8 Should orie then conclude, "The legal system responds
functionally to the needs of capitalism not to have legal rules en-
forced too strictly?" And one still has to account for what look like a
large number of anticapitalist rules, such as those restricting corpo-
rate powers, capitalization, and attempts to limit liability.51 Perhaps
here the explanation should be, "The legal system responds to the
functional needs o f capitalism to make concessions to its anticapital-
ist opponents." If one should be tempted to dismiss such rules (which
I think would be a serious mistake) as aberrant spasms of dysfunc-
tional Luddism, one can hardly do the same with the entire law of
slavery or with the crop-lien system, which effectively tied farm labor
to the land, that replaced it.
60
It's worth repeating, since arguments like these are so often mis-
understood, that this case for the indeterminacy of legal-economic
relations is directed against certain typical propositions of relations of
functional necessity, usually expressed in statements that some eco-
nomic process "required" support from the legal system, which then
responded to "meet the needs" of that process. The argument is not
57. See Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Emnent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose Zn the
State Courts, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 329 (1971).
58. See I THE PAPERS O. DANIEL WEBSTER 10 1-04 (A. Konefsky & A. King eds. 1982).
59. See, e.g., J. CADMAN, THE CORPORA.TION IN NEw JERSEY: BUSINESS AND POLITICS,
1791-1875 341-62 (1949); E. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860
373-90 (1954); J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970. at 12-57 (1970).
60. There is actually a fairly strong functional case for slavery's contribution to the
capitalist economy. though it's not one that modern liberal lawyers often make. For one
thing, slavery seems to have been quite an "efficient" system of production in itself, as well as
the primary generator (through cotton exports) of the foreign exchange that financed North-
ern industrial development. For another, it was slavery that made it possible for whites to be
the independent individual proprietors who are the heroes of the Scottish enlightenment story
of the expansion of liberty and commerce. E. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY-AMERICAN
FREEDOM (1975).
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that "legal" and "economic" practices bear no or purely random re-
lations to one another (though many Critics doubt that these catego-
ries are very helpful). Regular, patterned, and moderately
predictable (at least in the short-to-medium-term) causal relations
are always springing up between specific legal and economic prac-
tices-though the lessons of Realism are that one has to get down to
very concrete situations before one can describe what they are.
These causal relations seem to contemporaries and to historians who
study them later to work loosely together into some sort of system.
Lawyers make their livings from their experienced insights into the
operations of these patterns or systems; policymakers and investors
make informed guesses, which are certainly not always wrong, that
the patterns will continue to hold. This Variation's argument is
that-though contemporaries and historians often believe the con-
trary-all the pieces of the system are very loosely articulated: Indi-
vidual pieces, even quite large ones such as the fundamental premises
of civil liability, the organization of enterprise in the corporate form,
worker's compensation schemes, or even the progressive income tax,
could have been even radically different without drastic conse-
quences to the master social/economic processes that the functional-
ist has supposed to require them. The next Variation's argument is
that the master social-economic processes themselves could have been
different, even radically different.
D. Variation # 4-Turn Background Social Necessity into Contingency
The preceding discussion pointed out the perils of matching legal
responses to social needs: You end up having either to concede that
the law has responded differently to the same needs or to multiply
the number of needs in order to account for the differences. The first
move calls into question the "functional" nature of the legal re-
sponses, the second whether it's useful to attribute "needs" to socie-
ties at all, especially needs emerging from the "logic" of some stage of
historical development.
Let me illustrate this second point by continuing the example I
used in my earlier discussion-the claim that legal rules promoted
capitalism by providing certainty. The earlier discussion showed
that it was dubious that the legal rules provided certainty at all.
That is, the rules as implemented often did not have their intended
effect. Further, there were many legal rules that actually created
uncertainty. And the functional explanations for these rules involve
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a variety of hypothesized social "needs," which are sometimes
conflicting.
The true functionalist, the functionalist sans peur et sans reproche,
may at this point refine her theory so as to explain how all, or almost
all, of these diverse legal phenomena meet social needs.61 But she
may now slide into the position that law just satisfies particular inter-
ests, rather than broadly defined needs, unless she can somehow ob-
jectify her notion of needs. This task, however-the specification of a
general legal sociology of economic development-will not be an
easy one. For she will immediately run across highly evolved dy-
namic capitalist societies that got that way through (despite?) radi-
cally different government policies towards capitalist enterprise:
refusal of subsidies for transport ventures, intolerance towards the
corporate form, state-sponsored insurance of workers against the risks
of unemployment and industrial accidents, coordination of major in-
vestment decisions through central bureaucracies, and promotion of
social and political stability through legal reinforcement of the "feudal"
rights of great agricultural proprietors.62 Of course, a nimble mind
can invent a functional explanation for anything, reserving a residual
category of "dysfunctional law" for the really tough cases, but such
an explanation would hardly square with the original "predictability
of transactions" hypothesis and would be in danger of falling into
complete banality. Banality becomes pure tautology when the func-
tionalist claim is reduced to one that the legal system responded to
the needs of capitalism with rules securing to individuals large bun-
dles of exclusion/exploitation/alienation rights that could be traded
in markets because such a legal regime is one of the main characteris-
61. She may now say, for example, that a legal system that is responsive to the needs of
capitalism helps to construct both the technological (e.g., subsidies and immunities to trans-
portation networks) and institutional (commerce-clause-based demolitions of local trade bar-
riers, negotiable paper, security devices, and corporations and partnerships to mobilize
capital) infrastructures for the development of enterprise. Such a system also delegates major
investment decisions to decentralized firms which are free to respond to market incentives,
stabilizes entrepreneurial expectations but destroys rentier ones; builds in adjustment mecha-
nisms to relax its rules when strict enforcement would pull everybody down; pacifies oppo-
nents through strategic concessions, welfare palliations, or symbolic gestures; and so forth.
62. See, e.g., K. BARKIN, THE CONTROVERSY OVER GERMAN INDUSTRIALIZATION
1890-1902, passim (1970); C. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH
OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975,passim (1982); C. KINDLEBERGER, ECONOMIC GROWTH
IN FRANCE AND BRITAIN 1851-1950, at 183-208 (1964); A. MILWARD & S. SAUL, THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIES OF CONTINENTAL EUROPE 1850-1914, at 318-22 (1977);
Landes, The Structure ofEnterprise in the ninetienth Centugy: the Cases of Britain and Germany, in 5
RAPPORTS: COMITi INTERNATIONALE DES SCIENCES HISTORIQUES, XL CONGR/s INTERNA-
TIONALE DES SCIENCES HISTORIQUES 107 (1960).
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tics most people use to define capitalism.63 But within that large defi-
nitional frame there have been many historical capitalisms. And
there might have been thousands more still.
I won't spend much time on this point because an immense Criti-
cal literature has done the job. The governing idea of structural-
functionalist sociology that all societies have needs to maintain equi-
librium has been sufficiently battered out of countenance, and the
grand evolutionary stage theories of eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
tury social thought have been gradually picked to pieces. As I said
before, legal writers have had too big an ideological stake in assum-
ing that objective background forces supply the basic directives in
social life to have contributed much to debunking such assump-
tions,64 but the whole debunking literature is at hand any time we
want to tap into it.65 So let me leave this topic with a couple of quick
examples of functionalist theories that assume objective social neces-
sity and of the critiques that point out the contingent nature of that
"necessity."
(1) Some legal writers have recently been captivated by Alfred
Chandler's thesis about the emergence of large, vertically integrated,
multi-divisional forms of corporate enterprise in the United States.
66
This captivation is not surprising: Chandler's thesis in its most un-
qualified form perfectly suits the criteria of the dominant vision. It
63. The funny thing is that even the definition doesn't really fit the historical exper-
iences from which it was extracted. Sugarman, Law, Economy, and the State in England
1750-1914: Some Major Issues, in LEGALITY, IDEOLOGY, AND THE STATE 223-30 (D.
Sugarman ed. 1983) contains an especially useful discussion of the commonly held view that
"absolute rights of property" are preconditions or defining traits of developed capitalist socie-
ties. These authors synthesize the results of many studies of English property, showing that
property forms approached very close to absolute individual ownership in medieval times,
and that a great diversity of restrictions and qualifications on property-holding forms per-
sisted through late phases of capitalist development. See Kennedy & Michelman, Are Proper),
and Contract EAaent/. 8 HOFSTRA L. REx'. 711, 764-69 (1980) (elegant demonstration that
socicties claiming to give full legal protection to private property and freedom of contract will
alo bt found to legally promote (1) zones of unrestricted "states-of-nature," in which people
are privileged to destroy one another's property at will (e.g., competition), and (2) commons,
in which wealth is owned collectively and people are forced to share in gains and losses).
64. There are distinguished exceptions. See, e.g., 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE
HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LA, 627-34, 653-57, 669-78 (1895) (confounding the conventional
wisdom on the evolution of property from communal to individual forms by asserting the
"individualism" of medieval property).
65. For a representative sample, see the works cited in notes 1-4. See also Appleby,
Modernization Theog " and the Formation of Modem Social Theories in England and America, 20 CoN'.
STUD. IN SOC'Y & HIST. 259 (1978) (discussing the different ideologies of "modernization"
adopted in England and America and the consequences of those differences for politics, eco-
nomic policies, and social change).
66. See A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND (1977).
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hypothesizes that these developments in the corporate form are func-
tional responses to a set of objective-sounding, universalizable, histor-
ical conditions (the attainment of a given stage of development of
technologies and markets). But Chandler has taken his evolutionary
model abroad and found that, in various European countries at
roughly comparable stages of market and technological develop-
ment, many of the features of American managerial capitalism were
missing, though some of them did show up much later, after World
War 1.67
A determined evolutionist wouldn't be upset by this discovery;
she'd just attribute the late developments in the European experience
to an evolutionary "lag" 68 and invent some ad hoc special reasons
for the missing ones. To his credit, Chandler is not content with such
a solution. He concludes instead that the differences are not entirely
attributable to flaws or deviations in the development of European
capitalism: They stem at least in part from differences in "cultural
attitudes and values, ideologies, political systems, and social struc-
tures. '"69 The reason that this full range of complex variables wasn't
used in the first place to explain the American experience (and it
wasn't; there is literally not a word about culture or social structure
in The Visible Hand, and only a few sentences about ideologies and
political systems) is that Chandler is committed to the determinism
of "organizational imperatives." He thinks of the other factors as
affecting only the design details of the functionally mandated proto-
typical form in different societies: You can take it with or without
options, soup it up or make it ride low; but these alterations are, as
Marxists say, "superstructural": Underneath them all is the same old
Chevy. One could have no quarrel with a method that combined the
various elements of the American experience into an "ideal type," a
model of organizational change self-consciously constructed for the
sake of comparative study; but there's a huge difference between
finding model explanatory patterns and reifying them into immuta-
67. See Chandler, The United States: Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism, in MANAGERIAL Hi-
ERARCHIES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIsE OF THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL EN-
TERPRISE 37-39 (A. Chandler & H. Daems eds. 1980).
68. To me, however, a more promising sort of explanation might be found, for instance,
in the political/ideological/cultural reasons why French entrepreneurs resisted copying
Americans before, but not after, World War I1. See generalqy R. K'ISEL, CAPITALISM AND THE
STATE IN MODERN FRANCE (1981) (discussion of French economic management in the twen-
tieth century).
69. Chandler. supra note 67, at 39. To give due credit to Chandler and the history-of-
entrepreneurship school from which he descends, they have always avoided the causal reduc-
tionism of economic history as the rational maximizing of everything.
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ble laws of historical development. The illegitimate move, the move
that turns history into apologetic ideology, is to start supposing that
one's ideal/typical pattern, actually made up of thousands of tiny
contingent practices, represents a universal historicalforce.
(2) There are two basic kinds of determinist stories now circulat-
ing about the evolution of legal/social forms for the organization of
the labor force in modern American society. The first of these, now
much in vogue among lawyer-economists, stems from neoclassical
theories of the firm and "transaction-cost" economics. It theorizes
that rational profit maximizing fuels the search for cost-reducing in-
novations in organizational form as well as in technology. In this ac-
count, the various hierarchical arrangements that have been used to
organize the work force appear as successions of progressively more
efficient methods of lowering costs of production, such as the cost of
monitoring workers to see they are doing as they are told."
The other main determinist story comes from the counter tradi-
tion, now almost as venerable as the first, of Marxist accounts of in-
dustrial capitalism. A school of modern historians following the lead
of Harry Braverman's pathbreaking work7 ' has transposed the opti-
mistic theme of cost reduction into the dark minor key of domina-
tion. For these historians, the evolution of work organization is the
story of the breaking of skilled workers' control over the labor process
in the late nineteenth century and of the inexorable homogenization
of labor through the deskilling of jobs. As it is for the complacent
functionalists, a historical logic is at work here: not the logic of cost
reduction but the logic of the subjugation and degradation of labor
under the conditions of monopoly capitalism.
If forced at gunpoint to choose between these two stories, one
should probably choose the second, if only because it's backed up by
historical research into a lot of real industries, job reorganizations,
and labor struggles: it has not been generated, as the first largely has,
70. See, e.g., Williamson, The Organzation of Work. A Comparative Instiztutional Aisessmnent, 1
J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 5 (1980). This story is the latest in a series now over two centuries
old of complacent functionalist accounts of how it's best for ever', one that workers are treated
as they are in industtial societies. It even seems to be on the point of displacing its immediate
predecessor, the Weber-Parsons-inspired industrial sociology explaining how the specialized
work tasks and bureaucratic hierarchies of modern production are results of the progressive
"rationalization" of social life in modern society. (The sting in this sociological tradition-
Weber's own horror at the claustrophobic imprisonment of the freedom of creative movement
in the "cage" of rationality-was carefully drawn before export.) See a/so Kennedy, Co3t Re-
duction Theo' as Legitimation, 90 YALE L.J. 1275 (1981) (discussion of the politics of this evolu-
tionarv world).
71. See H. BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITA, (1974).
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a priori out of a formal model with only a casual smattering of allu-
sions to the abundant empirical literature. The "efficiency" story is
also vulnerable on other grounds. For instance, many of the specific
features of early twentieth-century work organization, such as artifi-
cial job ladders fragmenting similar jobs into hierarchies of different
grades or the recruitment of many different ethnic groups followed
by the minute subdivision of departments by race and ethnicity,
seem far more plausibly explained as designed to divide and subju-
gate the work force than to reduce costs. Indeed, contemporaries
often observed that preventing labor from organizing was manage-
ment's purpose.12 In any case, the general thesis that hierarchical
forms of work organization are more efficient because they reduce
transactions costs is oddly inattentive to the possibilities of the
counter hypothesis that the best way to minimize costs of supervision
might be to delegate tasks to people you trust with lots of discretion
to work out the details of the job on their own, or for that matter, to
73have them design the tasks in the first place. .
Yet the story of the degradation of work under the logic of mo-
nopoly capitalism has problems of its own. That logic, if it was there
at all, worked itself out in remarkably various forms. Many studies
of specific labor-management struggles have appeared since
Braverman wrote, studies that have stressed the importance of the
relatively underdetermined variable of working-class solidarity, try-
ing to explain why that consciousness (which itself wasn't one thing,
but lots of different things, with different cultural/religious/political
roots) emerged in some settings rather than in others and how its
presence and the variant forms it took affected the counter strategies
of employers and the resultant capital-labor bargain. 4 In addition,
some of the most impressive studies we now possess. the historical
contributions of the segmented-labor-market economists, tell a more
72. For discussions of these explanations. see Marglin, 11 hat do Bosses Do?. RE\. RADI-
CAL POLIT. ECoN.. Summer 1974. at 60: Stone, The Origin ofJob Structures in the Sted Indu'tn.
RE\. RADICAL POLrr. EcoN., Summer 1974, at 113, 127-51, see also D. GORDON,. R. ED-
WARDS & MI. REICH. SEGMENTED WORK, DIVIDED WORKERS: THE HISTORICAL TRANSFOR-
tATION OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 112-64 (1982) (summarizing the evidence of this
phenomenon).
73. For some interesting empirical support for this counter hypothesis, see. e.g.. S.
BOWLE.. D. GORDON, & T. WEISSKOPF, BEYOND THE WASTEL.AND 122-78 (1983) (on high
costs of centralized supervision of the workforce); A. Fox, BEYOND CONTRACT: WORK,
POWER AND TRUST RELATIONS 66-119 (1974) (on the importance of trust in workplace or-
ganization): C. SABEL, WORK AND POLITICS 220-31 (1982) (on emerging alternatives to
"'Fordist" ways of organizing production in decentralized quasi--cottage" industries).
74. See, e.g.. H. GUTMAN, WORK, CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN INDUSTRIALIZING
AMtERICA (1976): D. MONTGOMERY. WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA (1979).
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complex story than Braverman's, one in which employers found the
strategy of controlling labor by degrading and homogenizing jobs in-
creasingly futile by the 1930's and then promoted the reskilling of cer-
tain jobs into an "independent primary segment" of privileged labor,
thus both registering concessions to the gathering union movement
and effectively limiting its spread.7" Finally, a glance at the compar-
ative evidence casts the usual doubts on whether any single set of
forms is required to serve a given social function. If the goal was to
pacify labor movements, other means might have served than the
degradation of work. The companies could have co-opted the unions
through co-determination, or got the state to fold the unions into a
tightly controlled junior role in a corporatist partnership, or treated
labor as a fixed rather than variable cost and given workers stable
wages and secure jobs in return for their undeviating discipline and
loyalty.76 Or, for that matter, the unions might actually have won a
measure of control over the labor process that satisfied at least some
of their aspirations for honorable work at a decent wage. The unions
didn't win what they hoped for, and one can suggest many reasons
why they didn't (including lots of reasons having to do with law and
the legal system), but the closer one looks at the process, the harder it
is to find an inexorable logic to it.
E. Variation #5-Fill the Vacuum Left by the Collapse of Functionalism
with Disengagement, Legitimating Ideologies, or Symbolic
Ritualism
Now that historical experience has turned out to be too prodigal
of multiple developmental paths and of multiple legal adaptations to
those paths for the comfort of traditional functionalist explanations,
where can one turn in the hope of finding some coherent explanation
of law-in-history? One possibility I've mentioned already: Explain
anything that happens in the legal system by referring to someone's
interest (Variation # 1). This method, subtly employed, yields narra-
tives that are both subtle and exciting, but sooner or later, as every
legal change is attributed in turn to a different set of bargains among
interests, as a form of explanation it's going to seem discouragingly
ad hoc. Moreover, one must at some point deal with what's known
75. See D. GORDON, R. EDWARDS & M. REICH, supra note 72.
76. For a useful analysis of mixed strategies of repression and co-optation adopted by
European states, see C. MAIER, RECASTING BOURGEOIS EUROPE 19-225 (1975); for the Japa-
nese variation, see Levine, Labor Markets and Collective Bargaining in Japan, in THE STATE AND
ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN 633, 647-49 (W. Lockwood ed. 1965).
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as the "autonomy" problem-the fact that legal norms and practices
aren't completely plastic and don't alter every time another set of
interests gets its paws on them because they do have some resilience,
some long- or medium-term continuity of inner structure." Indeed,
one of the properties that makes them legal norms and practices is
that they at least appear to stand aloof from the everyday conflicts of
civil society and to provide stable structures for the mediation of
those conflicts. The classic preoccupation of legal sociology has been
to try to pin down what's in this "autonomous" realm and theorize
about its relation to the rest of society. I present three theories that
are especially relevant to the background of the Critical approaches
to legal history.
1. Dis'engagement.
By "disengagement" I mean beating a retreat to the position that
although law is something that happens within societies, it doesn't
have any important relations with the rest of society. Law is a realm
of its own with its own history and categories and professional habits,
and the only other thing you can compare.it to is another legal sys-
tem. You can't hope to explain anything that goes on in it except by
reference to its own peculiar internal details or to its borrowings from
the details of other legal systems.' 8
77. If-just to focus on the most dramatic instance-one wants to explain the content of
the Federal Constitution, the Beardian method of analyzing the class positions and financial
stakes of the Framers is a perfectly valid first approach to the task (however snottily it may
have been treated by people who wince to see sacred writings traced to material interests).
But I think most people would now concede that this method yields results of strictly limited
value and that one can understand the framers' projects much better after trying to recon-
struct the general political language-the categories of thought and the basic assumptions
about reality-in which the Constitution was written. Compare C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1913) with G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMqERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
In some of the very best recent work in legal history, even writers thoroughly committed
to placing legal forms in social and economic context have stressed how important it is to
understand the internal structures and logics of such forms on their own terms. See, e.g.,
McCurdy. Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Busmess Relations: Some Parameters of
Laissez-Faire Constztutionalim, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIsT. 970 (1975); Scheiber, The Road to
Munn: Eminent Domain and Public Purpose in the State Courts, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 329 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971).
78. The "disengaged" have this much in -common with the old Formalist doctrinal his-
torians; but they've lost the Formalists' confidence that it's the very aloofness of law that gives
it central importance as the functional mainstay of the unfolding norms of property and
liberty. Our modern disengaged are a chastened bunch. Alan Watson actually subscribes to
the dominant vision's basic functionalism but believes that the legal system's imperviousness
to any but professionally ingrown practices makes it perpetually dysfunctional. See A. WAT-
SON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE (1977); see also Abel, Book Review, 80 MICH. L. REv. 785
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There are grave problems with this approach. For one thing, as
legal sociologists like Friedman and Macaulay point out, these writ-
ers, writing about the insular lawyer's law of cases, seem to be talking
about awfully tiny corners of the law in any age (compared to legisla-
tion, administration, decrees, local law and custom, etc.) and espe-
cially in the current age of statutes and regulations.79 If this is the
only "law" that legal intellectuals are going to write about, they will
weirdly and incomprehensibly restrict their field to topics that, at
least by their own hypothesis, aren't very important to anyone, in-
cluding lawyers themselves, who actually spend most of their time
dealing with statutes and regulations.
More seriously, I believe that disengagement is an obscurantist
approach to 'the autonomy problem. First, autonomy in my original
sense of long-run structural characteristics that make legal practices
outlast short-term swings in political pressure is hardly unique to
lawyer's law. Entire subdisciplines are committed to studying the
(1982) (dissecting not only Watson's thesis but legal functionalism generally). Charles Fried
has lost some of his old conviction that legal rules were derivable from Kantian norms and
now seems inclined to think that law doesn't resonate with anything but its own "'artificial
reason," and that law's social role is modestly confined to filling in the residual details of
regulatory schemes in the course of settling marginal disputes. See Fried, The Art/ical Reason
of the Law. or What Lawyers Know, 60 TEx. L. REV. 35 (1981). And Richard Epstein has
recently written a very good (except for its failure to acknowledge any of the work of the law-
and-society movement, which has been making similar points for years in the Law and Society
Review) piece on how common law rules don't seem to have any important social conse-
quences and are therefore best understood as belonging to the transhistorical discourse of a
peculiar fellowship of specialists, those charged with resolving those minor problems that oc-
casionally get tossed to the courts. See Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1717 (1982).
I can't help believing-though of course I can't even begin to prove it-that the strategy
of disengagement is partly a reaction to left-wing work (especially Morton Horwitz's. see M.
HORWITZ, supra note 56, and to a lesser extent Douglas Hay's, see Hay, Property, Authority and
the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
ENGLAND 17 (D.Hav, P. Rule, P. Linebaugh & E. Thompson eds. 1975)) that depicts law as
an instrument of ruling-class authority; it's the reaction of mainstream scholars saving indig-
nantly, "Well if that s the social meaning you're going to give to law, we're going to show it
doesn't have any at all." Years earlier, Roscoe Pound had the same reaction: confronted with
theories that tort law served the capitalist class, the one-time functionalist retreated to the
stance that tort law was a lawyer's creation irrelevant to anyone's needs. See Pound, The Eco-
nomic Interpretation and the Law of Torts, 53 HARv. L. REV. 365 (1940). Another way of attack-
ing the thesis that law serves the interest of ruling classes is, instead of disengaging law from
outside influence altogether, madly to proliferate outside influences, so that every interest gets
a crack at shaping the legal system. The "ruling-class-influence" is then buried under an
avalanche of other variables.
79. See, e.g., Friedman & Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract Teaching: Past, Present, and
Future, 1967 Wis. L. RE'v 805. Friedman and Macaulay do agree with the disengaged that
some law is autonomous lawyer's law and, to that extent, it is socially trivial, being the "law
of leftovers" that nobody cares enough about to regulate in some other way.
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autonomous characteristics of state structures such as bureaucracies
and armies to show how constraints of organizational forms, ingrown
traditions, professional ideologies, etc. affect how political agendas
are formed, options perceived, urged, or suppressed, and so forth.8"
Just as Realism taught us that judging, like legislation and adminis-
tration, was political policymaking, it ought to have taught us that
legislation and administration were, like judging, relatively autono-
mous.81 Thus, focusing on the autonomy of law to deny its relevance
seems somehow unsupportable.
Second, I find it very hard to believe that autonomous legal forms
are best understood as the product of a culturally isolated tribe of
beings. Would any society tolerate lawyers as mediators of disputes,
practical problem-solvers, or instruments of legitimate rule if the law-
yers' practices didn't resonate at all with anyone else's? It seems
much more probable that the specific legal practices of a culture are
simply dialects of a parent social speech and that studying the speech
helps you understand the dialect and vice-versa. Even a legal system
clotted with arcane technicalities is unlikely to depart drastically
from the common stock of understanding in the surrounding culture
in the methods it uses to categorize social realities, the arguments
about facts and values that it recognizes as relevant and persuasive,
and the justifications it gives for its exercises of power.
80. See, e.g., T. SKOCPOL, STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS (1979). I mean to say
much more here than that bureaucrats and legislators have their own "interests" that some-
times cut across, warp, or neutralize, the pressures of "outside" interest groups. I mean that,
like courts, bureaucracies and legislatures develop commitments to "doctrines" and "princi-
ples"-that is, to relatively abstract clusters of concepts that constrain their imaginations and
actions. I really think it's pure lawyers' conceit to suppose that courts are /indamentall differ-
ent in this respect from other legal institutions. True, our upper courts by tradition are sup-
posed to be more self-conscious and to publish at least the formal reasons for their decisions.
Yet if "autonomy" means, among other things, demonstrated capacity to stick to internal
priorities and settled ways of thought in the face of intense short-term political pressure, isn't
it likely that, say. the doctrines of the Pentagon's procurement and strategic planning estab-
lishments are at least as "autonomous" as those of most appellate courts? Maybe even more
so, because these establishments have more effective ways of suppressing dissenting opinions
for many useful examples of "autonomous" bureaucratic practices, see THE POLITKiS OF
REGULATION (J. Wilson ed. 1980).
81. In fact, the Realists never got that far because most of them turned out to be stuck
as fast to the case-law tarbaby as their Formalist predecessors. It may not be an exaggeration
to say that the relative inattention (despite honorable exceptions and what looks like a grov,-
ing interest in such subjects) to the "deep structures" cutting across diverse substantive fields
of legislation and administration is the major disgrace of modern legal scholarship. But I
would want to see such studies carried out not on the ground sometimes urged by my lavs-and-
society friends, that because appellate cases are freaky and exceptional legal scholars should
write about more typical legal products, but on the ground that such other products are in
essential respects no different from appellate cases.
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The position of the disengaged seems to me to rest on two confu-
sions. One is the confusion of a possibly valid methodological pre-
cept with a wholly invalid social theory. Theprecept is that when you
want to account for a legal form, you should start your search for
explanations in legal materials. This precept makes sense because
the form is bound to be embedded in a whole contextual structure.
For example, if you want to know what Cicero meant by "the public
good" it's a good idea to look for other uses he makes of the phrase,
what he contrasts it with, and how other lawyers use it. The theog is
that discourse that is autonomous in this sense must therefore be pe-
ripheral or irrelevant to everything else going on in the society. But
this theory doesn't follow from the precept at all. It's like saying that
because Cicero has a specialized usage of "the public good" his usage
must not have anything to do with contemporary Roman political
controversies."
The other confusion is between law as particular enactments or
events and law as clusters of practices and packages of enactments,
processes repeated not once but many times over. Law in the sense of
isolated enactments, decisions in a single case, or one proposition on
page 351 of a hornbook, is rarely of any immediate instrumental sig-
nificance.8 3 Epstein is surely right to claim that a few contract or tort
rules more or less in the nineteenth century wouldn't have mattered
82. Sometimes one even hears legal historians argue for a method on the basis of the
precept alone, claiming that since lots of law has a high technical content, the discipline of
legal history should be confined to explicating the content that lawyers best understand. But
"stuff outsiders can't understand" cannot be seriously proposed as a useful category for the
study of social life, especially since laymen do come regularly into contact with these particu-
lar bundles of esoterica. At best, this very narrow view might be appropriate for people who
saw their competence as purely auxiliary, similar to numismatics, epigraphy, or "quantita-
tive and statistical methods." As legal specialists, they would stand ready to act as technical
advisors to real historians. But the most insular of legal historians, far from being anxious to
attach their specialties to general historiography, don't pay any attention to it at all!
83. This statement itself is confused. There really isn't any such thing as an isolated
enactment. Every case or statute is just one event in a complex series leading up to and away
from that event as well as a piece of the giant puzzle-structures of social interpretation that
categorize the event and give it a meaning in relation to other "like" and "unlike" events.
Hence, it's not a little misleading to speak of the "effect of a legal rule" as if the rule were just
a single blip on the legal grid; the rule-event wouldn't have happened at all if people in the
social sphere hadn't been preparing for it in some way. Much legal enactment just "ratifies"
conventions that have already crystallized in social relationships. By the time the rule ap-
pears, the social struggle to produce it is already over, so the enactment doesn't appear to
have any "effect." For an example in the context of family law, see Friedman, Law Reform in
Hitorical Perspective, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351, 362-64 (1969) (passage of the Married Wo-
men's Property Acts).
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much to anyone.84 But the whole complex of contract, tort, and
property rules? The whole apparatus of debt collection? Slave codes
and fugitive slave laws? One might suppose, without falling back
into the functionalist position that all this law had to exist in order to
serve the needs of basic economic or evolutionary processes, that it
was pretty important in constituting social life as actually exper-
ienced, and that removing any of these big pieces might well have
drastically altered that experience.85
The disengaged have added persuasively to the critiques of func-
tionalism, at least in the area of lawyer's law. But those of us whom
they have failed to convince of law's total irrelevance to social life
have to look elsewhere for our theory. One obvious place to look for
84. See Epstein, supra note 78. Individual statutes also may not have mattered, though
Epstein, curiously, distinguishes these. See id at 1718-20.
85. Even more methodologically questionable than the fragmentation of legal causes
and effects into isolated events-hardly of course a problem confined to the disengaged
alone-is the positivist attitude that encourages such fragmentation: the assumption that the
only kinds of statements 'about reality that are worth coming up with are empirically falsifi-
able statements about the probabilities under varying specified conditions that certain -legal
behaviors" will elicit "social behaviors" (or vice-versa) in response. Sometimes this attitude
deepens into the absurd claim that whatever you can't make such a statement about must not
be there at all! This attitude is not confined to the disengaged; indeed, it has recently been
voiced within CLS itself, in an exceptionally interesting piece by Alan Hyde that questions
the utility of the concept of -legitimation" in legal sociology, essentially on the ground that
the theory that people obey laws because they think them legitimate lacks convincing empiri-
cal support. See Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. REv.
379.
This isn't the place to attempt a comprehensive critique of Hyde's careful and detailed
argument. But I would like to relate the following story, adapted from John Womack's great
history of the Mexican Revolution: The Revolution started because sugar planters began to
expand their landholdings in order to rationalize the practice of commercial agriculture.
They used force to expel peasants from their lands, but took care to back up every expulsion
with land registration legislation, recording acts. and condemnation proceedings. all ratified
by local courts. The villagers, for their part. saw themselves as defending legal title to their
lands. The chief of the Morelos pueblo passed on to his successor, Emiliano Zapata, the
pueblo's most precious possession, a packet of title documents. Zapata and his followers
joined the revolution because they could not get "justice" (true law) through existing forms of
law. They fought to establish national and local governments that ,vould do justice
Throughout the struggle the villagers would surrender positions held by force in return for
legal guarantees (which if given were alw)ays betrayed). See J. WOMACK. ZAPATA AND TIIE
MEXICAN REVOLUTION 44, 52-66. 371-82 (1968).
The planters and their political allies would not move except under the forms of law-to
reassure foreign countries, the potentially hostile middle class, and (as much as anyone else)
themselves that the rights of property were on their side. The pueblo rose in revolt because
their rights of property had been violated. I really don't know whether the concept of "legiti-
mation," admittedly vague, overused, stretched to fit far too many different purposes, is the
best concept to use in explaining why legal forms mattered so much to these people. but I
can't help thinking that some kindred notion must be.
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a theory of the social relevance of law is at theories of the law as
legitimating ideology.
2. Law as (legitimating) ideology.
Like the theory that law serves the interest of dominant groups,
this one has come to be associated with the left, but again there's no
necessary connection. Mainstream liberal functionalism has its own,
Durkheimian version of the legitimating role of law: Legal norms are
primary expressions of and means of reproducing the "shared values"
that function as the integrating glue in liberal societies, orienting eve-
ryone's highly differentiated tasks towards a set of common social
purposes.8 6 But concededly it has been the left-wing theories, theo-
ries that have emerged to deal with the difficulties posed by the "au-
tonomy" problem for any account of law as the direct instrument of
class oppression, that have attracted the most attention. Let me, for
convenience's sake, try to arrange some of these theories on a spec-
trum, starting with those closest to straight instrumental theories,
and ending with those emphasizing the most diffuse and indirect
ways in which law makes up the elements of a culture:
(1) "All law is pig law dressed up in judges' robes." That is, law
is a means for organizing the ruling class and for coercing, cheating,
and disorganizing the working class. Thus, law allows capital freely
to collectivize but sets limits on labor combinations; it allows "capital
strikes" (disinvestment) but restricts labor strikes; it confirms capital-
ist control over the organization of work; it criminalizes "vagrancy"
as a means of keeping docile the urban unemployed; and it provides
that employment is "at will" so that the unorganized work force has
no job security.
(2) "The ruling class induces consent and demobilizes opposition
by masking its rule in widely shared utopian norms and fair proce-
dures, which it then distorts to its own purposes." For example, the
classical bourgeois legal norms of "private property," "free contract,"
"free speech," and "due process" express universal longings for secur-
ity, privacy, autonomy, free choice about what to buy and sell and
whom to work for, the right to speak one's mind freely, and the uni-
versal desire for protection against arbitrary coercion. But in a class
society these supposedly universal norms are deployed for the benefit
of a particular class. Private property, free contract, (complex and
expensive) due process, (well-heeled-and-organized-interest-group-re-
86. See, e.g., T. PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION (2d ed. 1949).
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sponsive) democratic procedures, and even (expensive-and-technol-
ogy-dependent) free speech operate de facto to reinforce the
advantages of wealth and power. The victims of these outcomes feel
powerless to complain because the outcomes seem to have been pro-
duced by legitimate rules and procedures.
(3) "The ruling class confirms its rule by actually making good
on enough of its utopian promises to convince potential opposition
that the system is tolerably fair and capable of improvement, even
with all its faults." This proposition is essentially Machiavellian.
The ruling class periodically sets up demonstrations to convince peo-
ple that it really does rule in the universal interest.87
(4) "The ruling class itself is taken in by legal ideology; it believes
that it's acting justly when it acts according to law, that everyone is
getting approximately the best possible deal, and that change would
make everyone worse off." This formulation is getting closer to the
meaning of ideology in classical social theory: a partial vision of the
world that appears to its proponents as well as to its victims as a
universal vision. (In fact, in the case of the ideology of the "rule of
law," middle-class people are rather more sold on it than working or
lower-class people.)
(5) "Law isn't just an instrument of class domination, it's an
arena of class struggle." The content of legal rules and practices is
ideologically tilted in favor of class rule (or, more generally, the re-
production of current modes of hierarchical domination, class-based
87. Some scholars who equate all left-wing legal thought and even "'Marxism" with this
ruling-class-conspiracy notion complain about how unfair it is: The ruling class is damned if
it screws the underclass and damned again if it treats it justly; what evidence would show that
the ruling class wasn't oppressive? See, e.g., Langbein, Albion's Fatal Flaws, PAST & PRESENT,
Feb. 1983, at 96, 114-15. I would respond to this criticism in several ways: First, historical
ruling classes have often behaved exactly as Machiavelli said they should. That is, they have
self-consciously reformed legal practices, making them more impartial and equitable, for the
precise purpose of staving off popular risings or of stealing the wind from political opponents.
The strategy is surely part of the prudential repertoire of any ruler, although it may not
always figure in the motivations behind the setting up of any particular regime of apparently
impartial justice. Much more important, the complaint simply misses the point of the radi-
cal's analysis of legal practices, which is usually meant not to criticize the rulers for ruling
nicely or to impugn their motives, but to help explain how a ruling class (especially a small
one in a large population, or one without a large standing army or police force) maintains its
rule? "By force and fraud," is always a part of the radical's answer, but especially in ad-
vanced Western societies where the direct threat of force is uncommon, the usual answer is.
"by consent (however grudgingly it may sometimes be given)." How does the ruling class
induce consent? By persuading people that they are getting, if not a good deal, at least the
best one they are likely to get, or perhaps the best one they are likely to get relatively easily
(because anything better would require much struggle, disruption, and above all the risk of
catastrophic failure).
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or otherwise), but ruling classes don't have everything their own way
when it comes to specifying that content. The concessions that cause
legal systems to respond to the interests and ideal aspirations of the
dominated result from bargains struck after hard struggle. The
norms embodied in legal rules therefore are always double-edged:
The underdogs who have won them can also be coopted by them; the
overdogs who concede them in order to coopt are always vulnerable
to being undermined by their radical potential.8
(6) "The discourse of law-its categories, arguments, reasoning
modes, rhetorical tropes, and procedural rituals-fits into a complex
of discursive practices that together structure how people perceive
and that therefore act to reproduce or to try to change people's social
reality." Because this assertion goes well beyond partial critique, and
is one of the core views of many of the Critics, I'll postpone elabora-
tion of it until the next section.
3. Law as Symbols and Rituals.
This is a catch-all heading for those writers who see much of what
goes on in the legal system as theatrical or religious public spectacles
and story-telling sessions that infuse ordinary social life with dra-
matic meanings and messages: the triumph of Virtue over Corrup-
tion, the marking off of a "sacred" sphere of ideals from the
"profane" world of fallen self-interest, the purification of society of
polluting deviance, the proclamations that most economic transac-
tions are fair and decent implicit in the stigmatizing of a few deals as
exceptionally rotten, the instruction that life is a game to be played
according to rules, and the trappings that tell you that authority is
authority.
I'm not sure why cultural anthropology of this kind, which seems
to me to be potentially one of the most exciting and fruitful sources
of new insights about law, is so undeveloped in our scholarship, espe-
cially since of what little there is, so much is marvelous work. 9
88. An important strand of Critical historical writing descends from this set of insights.
See, e.g., E. Fox-GENOVESE & E. GENOVESE, FRUITS OF MERCHANT CAPITAL 337-87 (1983)
E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 258-69 (1975).
89. See, e.go. T. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 185-88 (1935)(corporate reor-
ganization rituals); M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (1977) (dramaturgy of execu-
tions): L. FRIEDMAN, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA
COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, 1870-1910, at 150-95 (1981) (felony processes making hapless va-
grants into cardboard villains); E. KANTOROWiCZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES (1957) (medie-
val kingship); Hay, supra note 78, at 17-18 (terror-theatre of criminal assizes); Leff, Law and,
87 YALE LJ. 989 (1978) (litigation rituals).
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Doubtless part of the reason is our scholarship's occasionally con-
stricted positivist criteria for its rare excursions into social descrip-
tion, which sometimes suppose that whatever "effects" of law you
can't measure precisely must not be there at all; the rest is perhaps
simply that this sort of work is very hard to do.
F. Variation #6-Drawing upon Dirent Story-Lines
I have argued that the dominant vision of the meaning of modern
history is an optimistic liberal vision. 0 Its principal story-line is one
of the gradual recession of error before the advance of commerce,
liberty, and science-an advance modestly but invaluably assisted by
ever more efficiently adaptive technologies of law. There have been
failures and setbacks, and work remains to be done; but we have tri-
umphed over the major obstacles, and the remaining work is reme-
dial reform of the details. To be sure, opposing schools within
optimistic liberalism have developed somewhat conflicting stories:
One sees the late nineteenth-century common law as the summit of
legal enlightenment and the regulatory welfare state as a (presuma-
bly temporary) slide into Serfdom and Inefficiency; the other sees the
late nineteenth-century as a colossally misguided aberration and the
regulatory welfare state not only as a useful corrective but as a contin-
uation of the true American tradition of positive state interventions in
the interest of the commonwealth.
Such sharply conflicting views even within mainstream function-
alism had already shattered the tranquil complacency possible only
to those in possession of uncontested mythic-historical ground, but
this discord was nothing compared to the cries of distress that fol-
lowed the appearance of Morton Horwitz's The Transformation of Amer-
ican Law. " As an event in the history of American legal/intellectual
culture, this book is most interesting for its substitution of some of the
major pessimistic story-lines available in our culture for the optimistic
ones of the dominant vision:9 2 first, the story of the dark side of capi-
90. The vision, as it has approached our own time, has modulated its optimism into a
kind of grimly resigned complacency, which finds its tragic consciousness of flawed and futile
human capacities an inexhaustible stock of reasons why it would be futile to try to imagine
any better forms of social life than those that we happen to be accustomed to.
91. M. HORWITZ, supra note 56. For reviews explicitly Critical of the book for its pessi-
mism (though coming to diverse overall judgments), see McClain, Legal Change and Class Inter-
ests: A Review Essay on Morton Horwitz's The Transformation of American Law, 68 CALIF. L.
REv. 382 (1980); Gilmore, Book Review, 86 YALE L.J. 788 (1977), Reid, Book Review, 55
TEx. L. REv. 1307 (1977); Teachout, Book Review, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 241 (1978).
92. To my mind, however, the permanent importance of this book to scholarship lies in
its subtlety and richness as a history of legal ideology- an aspect of Horwitz's argument that
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talist development-the destruction of communal bonds and mean-
ingful faiths, the wrenching apart of families, the abolition of
honorable crafts, the routinization of work, the displacement of
norms of equitable dealing by an ethic of self-seeking as the highest
good; 3 second, the story of the declension from the Founders' vision
of Republicanism as the participation of independent citizens in civic
association for the public good to a business society of profit-maxi-
mizing privatistic individuals;94 third, the Populist story of the be-
trayal of the Revolutionary promise of democracy by plutocrats who
have, since the first Constitutional Convention, managed to wrest the
machinery of law and government away from the People and press it
into the service of the wealthy and powerful. 95
I attribute a good deal of the horror in the Critical reaction to
Horwitz, not to mention the absurd label of "Marxism," to his violat-
ing so many of the traditional canons of story-telling all at once. Af-
ter all, these story lines had been expressed previously by other
writers.96 It was all right for "social policy" to be instrumental to
economic purposes so long as these purposes were benign (industriali-
zation, economic growth, the needs of development) and so long as
one was mostly talking about legislatures. Horwitz, however, made
the many hostile reviewers who have pointed out its very real vulnerabilities as social and
economic history have chosen to ignore almost completely.
93. For an excellent survey and analysis of this deviant story-line, see Hirschman, Rival
Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble?, 20 J. ECON. LIT. 1463 (1982).
94. For a discussion of the persistence of the "republican" themes of the establishment
of civic virtue and its corruption in American life, see, e.g., Ross, The Liberal Tradition Revisited
and the Republican Tradition Addressed, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HIs-
TORY 116 (J. Higharn & P. Conkin eds. 1979).
95. The cornerstone work in this tradition is C. BEARD, supra note 77.
96. All of these are staple crops of mainstream Atlantic culture-so much so that I'm
staggered by hearing their use in Horwitz' book so constantly called "Marxist." For God's
sake, at any bar dinner you can listen to the most conservative lawyers talking about how the
fellowship of the bar (community), sense of professionalism (craft ethic), and devotion to the
public good (republicanism) have declined as the practice of law has become a business de-
voted to making money. Other legal historians had sounded these themes as well. Hurst told
how the capitalist ethic had destroyed public-regarding values as well as the Wisconsin
timberland in the mid-nineteenth century. See W. HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
(1964). Nelson and Reid lamented the sinking of the idea of law as expressive of communal
morality in the atomistic individualism of a commercializing nation. See W. NELSON, AMERI-
CANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAw (1975); J. REID, IN A DEFIANT STANCE (1977); see also
Hartog, Distancing Oneselfiom the Eighteenth Centur: A Commentarg on Changing Pictures of Ameri-
can LegalHisto, in LAW IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE REVOLUTION IN LAW 229
(H. Hartog ed. 1981). Scheiber showed how early corporate enterprise had manipulated law
to expropriate traditional rights as it marched onwards. See Scheiber, Property Law, Expropria-
tion, and Resource Allocation by Government, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232 (1973). But somehow none of
them ever provoked anything like the hostility that Horwitz did.
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over the purposes into capital accumulation through expropriation
and protection of profits from redistribution. He also implicated
elite lawyers and judges, and with them the common law tradition of
which they were the curators, as among the ringleaders of this dubi-
ous business. It was even all right (in the Realist tradition) to charge
common law judges with class-biased rulemaking, so long as one
safely limited the indictment to the ephemeral craziness of late nine-
teenth-century Formalism. Horwitz carried the charge back to the
early nineteenth century, the period that common lawyers had previ-
ously celebrated as their heroically "formative" era. I don't deny,
and neither at this date would Horwitz himself, that there are
problems with his thesis, and that some of the specific criticisms of his
evidence and conclusions are sound. But it's hard to account for the
volume and intensity of the adverse reactions without understanding
why the thesis should have touched so many nerves.
The reason all this matters is that the new availability of major
deviant story-lines about the main action in modern social/legal his-
tory has the effect.of relativizing the old story-lines, of making them
look not like uncontroversial assumptions but like what they are:
some among many possible interpretive frameworks in which to stick
historical evidence.
G. Variation # 7-Historicize Consciousness
The final twist on the dominant tradition that I'd like to mention
here, one that ends up playing a central role in Critical thought, is
simply the "Kuhnian"9 or "Collingwoodian"98 idea that the most
basic ways in which people conceive of the natural and social uni-
verses in which they live, the most elementary categories that people
use to organize everyday life, are culturally and historically contin-
gent; that is, they are specific to given places and times. Pure func-
tionalism, as we've seen, objectifies both social needs and adaptive
responses, claiming that these are universal categories of real life: hy-
pothetically, you can always tell, if you get enough data on a society,
what its needs are and whether its social forms efficiently meet them.
The historicist perspective, on the other hand, teaches that even the
conceptual language in which the functionalist advances her claim of
universal needs and adaptations is a time-and-culture-bound lan-
guage with a history-not a gentle progressive history in which su-
97. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLLrIONS (2d ed. 1970).
98. See R. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY (1946).
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perstition gradually gives way to science, but a history with
revolutions and disruptions in it.
There are two basic ways of pursuing the historicist approach.
One is simply to write the history of our own modes of thought, to try
to identify when our categories for organizing how we speak about
law solidified into something like their present shape. When, for ex-
ample, did we separate a private realm of "market" activity from a
public realm of "state" activity and come to think of the latter as
"intervening" in the former? When does the term "regulation" begin
to be used in its modern sense? When did tort separate from con-
tract, "corporation" come to mean mostly "private business enter-
prise," and "efficiency" achieve its present significance for antitrust
lawyers? When did lawyers start speaking of the the need to "bal-
ance" a multiplicity of "interests" in order to decide hard cases?9"
The other technique is the reconstruction of historical or cross-
cultural modes of thought in such detail as to illustrate (a) that other
societies have not shared the ways of thinking that we believe to be
essential and obvious (they just don't have a counterpart conception
to our idea of a "market" or of a "free individual," they don't think a
"corporation" is legally any different from a family or a city, and
either they don't distinguish between a "public" and a "private"
realm or they mean something completely different by the distinc-
tion), and (b) that these views were completely plausible for the peo-
ple who held them.' Such work can have a real political edge to it,
as when the historian takes a set of ruling ideological conceptions
that his own time condemns as cruel or mistaken-legal rationaliza-
tions of slavery, for instance, or the due process Formalism of the
Lochner era-enters into their world with (provisional) sympathy,
and then shows how much sense those conceptions make on their
W4. Perhaps the closest analogues to the histories of legal consciousness no%% being writ-
ten b% man% of the Critical legal historians are the histories of economic thought which studs
the historical emergence of its fundamentals, such as the grounding of social action in individ-
ual subjects rationally pursuing self-interest through exchange. See, e.g.. J. APPILEB,, Eco-
NOMI(" THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND (1978): L.
DUM)ONT. FROM MANDEN ILLE TO MARX (1977); A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 12, K. POLANY1.
THE -RLAT TRANSFORMATION (1944).
100 Some of the very best legal/historical writing does exactly this: Maitland's or Mc-
Ilwain's reconstruction of medieval world-views; Hurst'b description of nineteenth-century
American "bastard pragmatism"; Gordon Wood's recreation of the conceptual world of the
Constitution-writers. W. HURST, supra note 96, at 206, C. MCILWAIN, THE Hi(ai COt RT OF
PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY (1910); F. POLLOCK & F. MAITtL.,ND. supra note 64: G.
WooD, supra note 77.
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own terms.'0 ' The ways in which well-meaning gentlemen justified
their social order-the social order that had so well situated them-
as just and efficient may look uncomfortably familiar. But the lead-
ing edge of historicism cuts deeper still: it tells us that the difficulties
we have in imagining forms of social life different from and better
than those we are accustomed to may be due to the limits on our
conceptions of reality rather than to limits inherent in reality itself.
After all, perfectly smart and forward-looking Americans of about a
century ago habitually believed such things as that social order and
economic prosperity depended absolutely on the maintenance of per-
manent class divisions or slavery; that it was absurd utopianism to
suppose that blacks and whites could ever associate on terms of social
intimacy or equality (or if they did, the results would be biological
degradation of the species), that the physical constitution of women
unfitted them for attendance at colleges, that unemployment insur-
ance would take all the discipline and will to work out of the labor
force; and that judicial failure to enforce harsh bargains to their rig-
orously formal letter would bring on the imminent collapse of
capitalism.
Such historicism is not, in its weaker versions, actually incompati-
ble with functionalism. One could continue to suppose that univer-
sal processes generate needs for ideally adaptive responses while
conceding that both needs and responses will be perceived at differ-
ent times and places through different-colored, and more-or-less dis-
torting, conceptual lenses and filters. The strong position, on the
whole that adopted by Critical writers, is that both needs and re-
sponses, and indeed the idea of needs-and-responses itself, must be
seen as the cultural products of contingent modes of thought.
IV. GENERALIZING AND DEEPENING THE CRITIQUES: CRITICAL
LEGAL HISTORIES
Having at last completed the catalogue of variations, let me re-
state in summary form those that have done the most to inform the
varieties of Critical historiography:
1. The conditions of social life and the course of historical devel-
opment are radically underdetermined, or at least not determined by
any uniform evolutionary path.
101. See, e.g., E. GENOVESE, THE WORLD THE SLAVEHOLDERS MADE 114-244 (1969):
M. TUSHNET. THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860 (1981): Kennedy, Toward an
Historical I Understanding of Legal Consciousness- The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America,
1850-1940, in 3 RESEARCH L. & Soc. 3 (1980).
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2. The causal relations between changes in legal and social
forms are likewise radically underdetermined: Comparable social
conditions (both within the same and across different societies) have
generated contrary legal responses, and comparable legal forms have
produced contrary social effects.
3. If a society's law can't be understood as an objective response
to objective historical processes, neither can it be understood as a
neutral technology adapted to the needs of that particular society.
Legal forms and practices are political products that arise from the
struggles of conflicting social groups that possess very disparate re-
sources of wealth, power, status, knowledge, access to armed force,
and organizational capability.
4. Although they are the product of political conflict, legal
forms and practices don't shift with every realignment of the balance
of political forces. They tend to become embedded in "relatively au-
tonomous" structures that transcend and, to some extent, help to
shape the content of the immediate self-interest of social groups.
5. This relative autonomy means that they can't be explained
completely by reference to external political/social/economic factors.
To some extent they are independent variables in social experience
and therefore they require study elaborating their peculiar internal
structures with the aim of finding out how those structures feed back
upon social life. Given what so often appears to be the indetermi-
nacy of instrumental effects, a promising approach for such study
may be to treat legal forms as ideologies and rituals whose "effects"-
effects that include people's ways of sorting out social experience, giv-
ing it meaning, grading it as natural, just, and necessary or as con-
trived, unjust and subject to alteration-are in the realm of
consciousness.
6. Our accustomed ways of thinking about law and history are
as culturally and historically contingent as "society" and "law"
themselves. Though we can never completely escape from the limita-
tions of our environment, we can to some extent protect against the
risk of simply projecting our parochial categories onto the past with a
self-conscious effort to relativize our own consciousness, by trying to
write the story of its formative context and development and by try-
ing to reconstruct as faithfully as possible the different mentalities of
past societies before translating them into our own.
7. It will also help us to relativize our understanding of the
past's relation to the present if we see that our conventional views of
that relation are mediated by familiar narrative story-lines, that are
January 1984]
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so deeply entrenched in our consciousness that we are often unaware
of their rule over our conception of reality. These story-lines, like
other mentalities, have a history filled with ideological purposes, and
there always exist-and so we always may draw upon-competing
stories that impress the same historical experience with radically di-
vergent meanings.
Taken en bloc rather than separately, this set of partial critiques
adds up to a position that most people who see themselves as doing
Critical legal historiography would probably accept.1 1 2 Many,
though by no means all,"°3 would want to push the critique still
further.
A. Blumng the "Law/Society" Distinction
You might think that after the ravages of partial critique there
would not be much left of the dominant tradition. But there is. Its
skeletal frame, its division of the world into social and legal spheres,
tends to endure. Thus, even the more severe of the partial critics
continue to assume-although conceding that all over the landscape
of social life we can see the imprints, some deep and others almost
imperceptible, of feedback reactions from the "autonomous" outputs
of the legal system-that at bottom the really basic terms of commu-
102. I want to be clear that I am not making the absurd claim that particular people
affiliated with the Critical Legal Studies movement have ongina/ed these critiques. On the
contrary, those critiques are virtually all of long historical standing, to be found in Hegel or
Marx if not before; incorporated into the normal working assumptions of many social theo-
rists (e.g., Weber, Durkheim, Gramsci, Foucault, Giddens, Offe); historians of political and
economic thought (e.g., Maitland, Mcllwain, Ernst Kantorowicz, Pocock, Quentin Skinner,
Karl Polanyi. Hirschman); social historians (e.g. Bloch, Genovese, E.P. Thompson, M. I. Fin-
ley); virtually any modern intellectual historian; philosophers of science (e.g. Kuhn); and cul-
tural anthropologists (e.g., Geertz, Turner, Sahlins); as well as many legal intellectuals,
specifically among Legal Realists, sociologists, and historians. (This is my own, doubtless
idiosyncratic list: others might well put together a different one.)
What some CLS people have done, I think, is (a) to combine these critiques in an interest-
ing way; (b) to attempt to go somewhat beyond them, as specified in the next section; and (c)
to apply the results to the historiography of American legal doctrine and institutions. (Even
in these respects their work has been anticipated by others: I re-read recently a book pub-
lished nearly 40 years ago that seemed to me to fit most of the characteristics of what I'm here
calling "Critical" legal historiography: Louis Hartz's Economic Policy and Democratic Thought.-
Pennylvnama, 1776-1860 (1948).) Critical work may thus perhaps best be described as "dis-
tinctive" rather than "original," for surely it was only a matter of time before approaches
already so well developed in other fields of learning would be applied to law. I mention this
because scholars hostile to CLS work so often say, "Well, that's all old hat, there's nothing
original about that," using (as I see it) the accusation of unoriginality as a reason for not
engaging with the substance of the work. Let's all simply stipulate that it's not "original,"
that it's within a "school" or "tradition," and leave it at that.
103. See for example the debates summarized at notes 127-40 in~fa.
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nity life are set by conditions and relations we can, and should, de-
scribe independently of law: family ties, personal affections, power
struggles, technology, consumption preferences, association in inter-
est groups, and the organization of production. These conditions
and relations-the realm of "material life" in some formulations; of
"basic needs" of all societies or of particular evolutionary stages in
evolutionary functionalism; of "the forces of production" in some
Marxisms; of the "interests" of individuals or groups in liberal plural-
ist theory; and finally of the "preferences" of self-constituting indi-
vidual subjects in the ultimate reduction of classical and neoclassical
economics-comprise the "real world" which law may serve or dis-
serve or even partially twist out of shape but to which law is ancil-
lary. The fundamental operations of this world originate before law
and go forward independently of it; they fashion in general outline (if
not in tiny detail) the agendas and limits of legal systems and are
beyond the power of law to alter.
Yet, in practice, it is just about impossible to describe any set of
"basic" social practices without describing the legal relations among
the people involved-legal relations that don't simply condition how
the people relate to each other but to an important extent define the
constitutive terms of the relationship, relations such as lord and peas-
ant, master and slave, employer and employee, ratepayer and utility,
and taxpayer and municipality. For instance, among the first words
one might use to identify the various people in an office would likely
be words connoting legal status: "That's the owner over there."
"She's a partner; he's a senior associate; that means an associate with
tenure." "That's a contractor who's come in to do repairs." "That's
a i mp they sent over from Manpower." This seems an obvious
point, but if it's correct how can one square it with the standard view
of law as peripheral to "real" social relations? Could one, for exam-
ple, seriously assert that "the law of slavery has tended to play only a
marginal role in the administration of slave societies"? Slavery is a
legal relationship: It is precisely the slave's bundle ofjural rights (or
rather lack of them) and duties vis-A-vis others (he can't leave, he
can't inherit, he has restricted rights of ownership, he can't insist on
his family being together as a unit, etc.) that makes him a slave."0 4
104. See Finley, The Servile Statuses of Ancient Greece, in ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN AN-
CIENT GREECE, 133, 134-35, 148-49 (B. Shaw & R. Saller eds. 1981) (using the "juristic"
method, accompanied by proper cautions about its limits, to analyze the spectrum of servile
statuses in the ancient world). I see no reason to change this conclusion after reading Orlando
Patterson's important new study attacking strictly "legal" accounts of the master-slave rela-
tion. See 0. PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1-62
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Change the bundle significantly and you have to call him something
else. And how could one say something like "medieval law bolstered
(or undermined) the structure of feudal society"? Again, a particular
(though concededly in this case very hazily defined) set of legal rela-
tions composes what we tend to call feudal society. If those relations
change (commutation of in-kind service to money rents, ousting of
seignorial jurisdiction to punish offenses, etc.) we speak not simply of
changes in "the legal rules regulating feudal institutions," but of the
decline of feudalism itself.
I would guess that the notion of the fundamentally constitutive
character of legal relations in social life is probably a lot easier to
understand when made about slave or feudal societies than about
liberal societies. After all, in liberal societies, differences of legal sta-
tus are not supposed to define social relationships, but merely to
channel and facilitate them. In theory, one can, in a liberal society,
choose one's legal status to suit one's underlying, material, func-
tional, real purposes; with "freedom of contract," one even gets to
create that status .within the limits set by public law. But a whole
generation of Realists taught us to see that a regime of free contract
delegates to those who contract legal powers, subject to a host of im-
portant legal exceptions, to coerce performance according to the con-
tract;' O5 and the establishment of private property gives the
proprietor a set of legal powers, again subject to important legal limi-
tations, to dictate to others the terms of access to his property: t"" and
the chartering of a corporation entitles the managerial Few to make
binding decisions affecting the lives and fortunes of the laboring and
shareholding Many. 0 7 These bundles of rights and powers, dimin-
ished by exceptions and limitations, with which members of liberal
societies are endowed, are Critical determinants of the terms of their
relations with one another. For instance, it usually matters a lot in
an employment relationship whether or not Employee is or is not
(1982). For one thing, neither I nor any of the Critics would ever describe a set of social
relations in exdcuszve4y legal terms. For another, Patterson's attack is really only on a particu-
larly misleading legal account of slavery as "property rights in human beings"; as he truly
says, slavery is only a special case. a peculiar bundle, of such rights. The real question for him
is how such a set of legal relations is created, which he argues is by a process of "symbolic
appropriation" resulting in the slave's "'social death." For the consistency of this approach
with that of the Critics. see text accompanying notes 115-24 in/ia.
105. See. e.g.. HOHFELD, FUNPAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923).
106. See, e.g.. Cohen, Property and Sozereignty; 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); Hale, Coercion
and Distribution in a Supposedly' Non-Coercive State. 38 POL SCI. Q. 470 (1923).
107. Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority, Sovereignty and Associations in the Common
Lau, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 599 (1981).
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employed at will, a major stockholder of the business, an illegal im-
migrant, married to Employer, protected against being fired for try-
ing to organize other employees, and so forth. In each case, a
different complex of background legal entitlements factors into the
power relations between the parties. Of course, nobody is going to
claim that law explains more than a fraction of the power differences
between these people. The employee may be the only person who
understands the filing system, or be irresistibly attractive or physi-
cally intimidating, or just have been there for ages, or have lots of
alternatives in the market (though of course that "market" itself is
importantly structured by the legal regulations of what may be
owned and traded in it, subject to limitations, and by the property
entitlements of all the traders in it).' °8 It is, of course, possible to
imagine, as for example G. A. Cohen has done in his extremely inge-
nious attempt to demonstrate that one can describe a "material" core
of social relations without any "law" in them at all,"0 9 a Hobbesian
power balance of force that is destabilized every time somebody
sharpens a stick or lifts a weight. But in actual historical societies,
the law governing social relations-even when never invoked, al-
luded to, or even consciously much thought about-has been such a
key element in the constitution of productive relations that it is diffi-
cult to see the value (aside from vindicating a wholly abstract com-
mitment to "materialist" world views) of trying of describe those
relations apart from law. Power is a function of one's ability to form
and coordinate stable alliances with others that will survive setbacks
and the temptations of defection to satisfy opportunistic interests.
Such organization and coordination are bound to involve something
legal. Indeed, one is likely to find the conditions of the Hobbesian
state of war precisely in those instances where law has explicitly or by
108. To give another example, assume two people are having an argument in a car.
One bays, "'Get out of n% car." The other says, 'It's not your car, it's the company's car. I
have as much right to be here as you do." The first: -'I'm driving today. so as far as you're
concerned it's mN car: and I want you to get out.'" This is of course a fairly complex. if utterly
commonplace legal argument-unusual if at all only in that the claims and counterclaims are
very explicit instead of being just silent background assumptions. Of course, factors other
than legal relations may be involved. One of these guys may be a lot bigger than the other or
have a long-run stake in the other's amiability or good opinion. But the law of the situation is
a potentially critical factor in its resolution.
109. See G. COHEN, KARL MARX'S THEORY OF HISTORY; A DE-ENCE 216-48 (1978L
The book as a whole is a brilliant attempt to rehabilitate an orthodox-Marxist version of
functionalism, in which, as in the dominant vision, law is one of the ideological superstruc-
tures called into being by the requirements of the material forces of production, which then
reacts upon and mingles with those material forces. For a particularly useful (and to me,
convincing) response to Cohen, see H. COLLINS, MARXISM AND LA% 81-85 (1982).
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silence established a combat zone in which people are endowed with
(in Hohfeldian terms) privileges to inflict harm upon one another
and are denied any legal means of restricting that harm- (as when the
legal regime says a wife can't be raped or that contracts between
husband and wife are not enforceable). Clearly (as Cohen for exam-
ple points out' 10), people can struggle to improve their position vis-a-
vis others by changing the rules that define their entitlements, but that
doesn't alter the fact that the bundle of legal endowments they start
out with positions them for the struggle, and may make all the differ-
ence as to whether they win, lose, or get a good compromise deal.
The new deal, when sufficiently stabilized in practice, will simply be
the new legal constitution of their relationship.
More prosaically, the "interests" in the instrumental account that
make demands upon the legal system are not self-constituting prele-
gal entities. They owe important aspects of their identities, traits, or-
ganizational forms, and sometimes their very existence to their legal
constitution. For example, "taxpayers" are partially families, part-
nerships, or individuals, because of the legal definition of these units;
"New England gas consumers" pressing the Congress for relief from
high prices are partially a "regional interest" because of the legal
form of territorial representation; "Communists" are not an interest
represented as such in labor unions because of legal excommunica-
tion; whereas the true identity of the "corporate client" to whom a
corporation's lawyer owes her undivided loyalty is an unsolved mys-
tery, because of conflicts in legal theory. For the most part, the legal
creation of "interests" and the selection of their representatives pro-
ceed too quietly for notice-save on those occasions where formal
choice must be made, as in deciding whether the "Sierra Club" may
represent people who care about the environment in class actions or
administrative proceedings."'
Understanding the constitutive role of law in social relationships
is often crucial not only in characterizing societies but in accounting
for major social change. Robert Brenner's remarkable work on
preindustrial Europe," 2 for instance, identifies two general patterns
of social adjustment to the population declines of the late Middle
Ages: a (typically) Western pattern in which the labor shortage re-
110. G. COHEN, supra note 109, at 216-48.
111. See, e.g.. J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY (1978); Katz, Studies in Boundary Theom: Three
Essays in Adjudication and Politics, 28 BUFFALO L. RE%-. 383 (1979), Yeazell. From Group Litga-
tion to Class Action Part I" Interest. Class and Representation, 27 U.C.L.A. L. RE%. 1067 (1980).
112. Brenner. Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe.
PAST & PRESENT. Feb. 1976, at 30.
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sulted in more favorable labor terms for the peasantry, and a (typi-
cally) Eastern pattern in which the same shortage brought about an
intensification of serfdom, a tightening of the lords' control over their
serfs. Brenner's (richly detailed and here much simplified) explana-
tion for this dichotomy is that the landlords' ability to tighten control
instead of having to grant concessions depended critically upon the
balance of class power that had come to prevail in their particular
society. A central component of this power balance was the set of
legal relationships that had been established between the classes.
Where peasant communitieswere strongly organized, they had, over
the centuries, managed to wring concessions from their lords, which
had been institutionalized as law. Thus institutionalized as rights,
these concessions could not be withdrawn without provoking mas-
sive resistance." 13 Brenner goes on to argue that where (as in France
and parts of western Germany) these customary rights of peasant
proprietorship persisted through the early modern period they did so
because centralizing states helped to secure these rights against the
lords and thus retarded the process of capitalist consolidation of
landholdings. In England, by contrast, where such rights had been
eroded for a complex of reasons, small proprietors were unable to
resist eviction.
Maybe the point that law and society are inextricably mixed
seems hard for legal writers to grasp because they sometimes restrict
their view of what law is to a bunch of discrete events that occur
within certain specialized state agencies (in the most restrictive view,
the courts alone) and therefore assume that the only question for a
social history of law is the relation between the output of these agen-
cies and social change. But if that output is all there is to law, how
on earth are we going to characterize all the innumerable rights, du-
ties, privileges, and immunities that people commonly recognize and
enforce without officials anywhere nearby? Slavery, for instance,
may well make its first appearance in the temporary emergency prac-
tices of a settlement, harden over the next few planting seasons into
invariable custom, and, decades later, when the localities decide they
want the help of centralized enforcement authority, become the sub-
ject of legislation in slave codes. When should a sociologically
113. Whoever objects at this point that the "law" involved in this description is only
epiphenomenal to the "social fact" of "organization" will have to try to find some way to
describe that organization without mentioning the rules whose maintenance was its raison
d'tre or the institutional forms in which its tasks were carried out-not to mention "Fight to
Protect Your Rights!" as a means of organization itself.
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minded historian (as opposed, for example, to a legal-positivist juris-
prudent) start to speak of the emergence in this society of the legal
institutions of slavery? At any point, I should think, when she finds
the ordinary practices and discourses of that society assuming or ap-
pealing to the collectively shared and maintained notions of right
and obligation that support that institution, the moment when
power becomes institutionalized as "right." Thus, the social/legal
historian who began her account of slave law in these settlements with
the codifications would rightly be accused of leaving out the most
important part of the story.1 4 Furthermore, even if the historian re-
fused to recognize custom as law until it was ratified by some official
agency, she won't get very far towards understanding the role of law
in social change if she looks only for the immediate social effects of
marginal changes in discrete enactments and ignores the whole invis-
ible background network of rules (like the basic law of property) that
are silently incorporated into people's lives.
Again, since it all seems so incredibly obvious once it's said, what
explains the persistent view of law's marginality in social life? Partly,
it comes from the view of generations of disillusioned reformers-
liberal reformers mostly, I suspect-who have come to doubt
whether more than marginal social change can be achieved through
deliberate promotion by those in control of the mechanisms of the
liberal state. But this proposition is not really about the limits of law;
it is about the limits of selective types of attempts to reorient, usually
from the top down, selective formal institutions. Most legal change
takes place all through civil society, in thousands of small interac-
tions usually with no official visibly present at all. It's strange, in a
way, that the Realist and Law-and-Society scholars, who taught us
to see the law "in action" as well as the law "on the books," should so
often be the very same people who revert to restrictive Formalist
views of law when they stress, in Pound's words, "the limits of effec-
tive legal action." There is a real disjunction here between their soci-
ological analysis of the law constituting the status quo as dynamic,
informal, and political, and their programmatic analysis of the law
needed to bring about change as static, formal, and bureaucratic.
The view that law is marginal in social life probably also registers
114. Actual historical societies have conveniently simplified her task in some cases by
adopting prefabricated bundles of officially-legal relations. The way slavery came to the Vir-
ginia settlements, for instance, was by importation of blacks who were already enslaved some-
where else. W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK 71-82 (1968); E. MORGAN, supra note 60, at
295-337. The story nicely illustrates the point that when people go about putting together
their "material" economies, they use the "ideal" building blocks of legal relations.
[Vol. 36:57
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an overreaction to the preceding generation of Formalists, who often
behaved as if once you described the legal form of an institution or
practice, you had described the whole thing. A "corporation" or a
"city" appeared as nothing more than a shell of legal rights and pow-
ers. The Realist successors to these Formalists yearned to break
through the formal shell to (as they often expressed it) the "living"
reality beneath it: the "realities" of trade practices, power politics,
emotional ties, "behavior," and, of course, social needs. But there is
no way to detach essences from their forms: The law (in the catholic
sense that I've been using) was all along a part of the reality. If the
program of Realists was to lift the veil of legal Form to reveal living
essences of power and need, the program of the Critics is to lift the
veil of power and need to expose the legal elements in their
composition.
B. Law as Constitutive of Consciousness
Many Critical writers would, I think, claim not only that law
figures as a factor in the power relationships of individuals and social
classes but also that it is omnipresent in the very marrow of society-
that lawmaking and law-interpreting institutions have been among
the primary sources of the pictures of order and disorder, virtue and
vice, reasonableness and craziness, Realism and visionary naivet6
and of some of the most commonplace aspects of social reality that
ordinary people carry around with them and use in ordering their
lives. To put this another way, the power exerted by a legal regime
consists less in the force that it can bring to bear against violators of
its rules than in its capacity to persuade people that the world de-
scribed in its images and categories is the only attainable world in
which a sane person would want to live. "Either this world," legal
actions are always implicitly asserting, "some slightly amended ver-
sion of this world, or the Deluge."
A familiar example of the way in which legal categories affect
social perceptions would be the-carryover into common speech and
perceptions of the legal distinction between Public and Private
realms of action, the Public being the sphere of collective action for
the welfare of all through the medium of government (and thus the
only realm of legitimate coercion), and the Private being the sphere
of individual self-regarding action." 5 Those who have internalized
this distinction as part of the natural order of things, as all of us have
115. For representative Critical treatments of the Public/Private distinction as it has
been applied to specific areas of law, see the articles by Paul Brest, Gerald Frug, Morton
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to some extent, are perfectly capable of deriving from it conclusions
such as this: It is an invasion of the privacy and autonomy of a (pri-
vate) corporation for (public) OSHA inspectors to come upon its
premises without a warrant, but the same company's management
can post time-study monitors in the workers' washrooms because the
workers have (impliedly) consented to this in advance by private
contract.
I don't for a moment mean that this particular set of conclu-
sions-in which readers are bound to recognize the classic late nine-
teenth century mind-set, recently dusted off for revival-flows
inexorably from the Public/Private distinction. One could certainly
also conclude, as many people have, that corporations, being organ-
ized collectives endowed by law with effective coercive power over
people within their jurisdiction (on their property), are like states and
may therefore exercise their power only through politically accounta-
ble forms.' 16 The crucial point here is that both sets of conclusions
are inferred from the same Public/Private classification (coercive-col-
lective states vs. freely choosing individuals) that sets fairly severe
limits on the ways in which we can imagine the world and how to
change it." 7
Let me try another, perhaps slightly less abstract, example which
I hope might illuminate some of the differences between functionalist
and Critical styles of historical explanation. A nineteenth-century
state that we'll call "Wisconsin" enacts a "lumber-lien" law-that is,
a statute giving loggers of wood a priority lien for their wages in the
proceeds from the sale of cut timber." 8 How might an historian ap-
proach the interpretation of this bit of law?'1 9 A good straightfor-
ward functionalist approach would look for the context of a social
"problem" to which the law was an attempted response or solution.
Horwitz, Duncan Kennedy, and Karl Klare in the recent Pennsylvania Law Review Sympo-
sium on the Public/Private Distinction. 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1246 (1982).
116. See, e.g., W. 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE (1940); Berle, For llhom Cor-
porate Managers are Trustees.- A Note, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1365 (1932); Berle, Constitutional Limita-
tions on Corporate Activity- Protection of Personal Rights fiom Invasion Through Economic Power. 100
U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1952).
117. Indeed the separation of law from society in what I have called the dominant vi-
sion of legal scholarship is itself a product of the Public/Private distinction. No matter how
much Realist and post-Realist scholars blur the distinction in their empirical work on the
"law in action," they usually end up reasserting it when they describe the "limits of effective
legal action." See text accompanying note 26 supra.
118. As the choice of this example probably reveals, it was developed in conversation
with Willard Hurst.
119. The following paragraph is not my proposed history of the log-lien law but merely
a sketch of how one might approach the task of interpreting its history.
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Let us suppose that our functionalist historian finds such a problem
in the circumstance that logging enterprises were short of liquid capi-
tal out of which to pay wages but needed to attract labor into the
forests for a long winter's work. The solution to this problem was to
give some additional security for wages in the lien, which was some-
what easier to enforce legally and less subject to trumping by other
claims than was an ordinary action for breach of contract. There is
nothing wrong, it seems, with this explanation as far as it goes. But
then one starts to wonder: Why this solution rather than others one
could think of-others that were actually adopted in nearby times
and places? Here's a quick offhand list of potential solutions that
doesn't even begin to exhaust the possibilities: (1) use slave labor in
the forests; (2) use conscript labor-either as part of compulsory mili-
tia service or as a statutory duty of every able-bodied man in the
state; (3) raise the capital fund for wage payments out of taxes; (4)
refuse to "intervene in the private contracts" between logger and em-
ployer, and let the loggers contract, if they can, for their security
interest in the wage bargain; (5) run logging as a state enterprise,
paying loggers out of general revenues or out of an excise .tax on log
sales; (6) make the loggers general partners in the enterprise, entitled
to manage company concerns and to share in company profits. In
the perspective created by some of these alternatives, the lumber-lien
law appears to have been the product of a political consciousness in
which, for example, "enterprise" was "private," though the state
might be expected to help it out and even "regulate" a bit, and in
which labor was "free" but definitely subordinate. The main point I
want to make here is that this statute was not only theproduct of such
a consciousness but helped to reproduce that consciousness by con-
firming it. The statute's enactment made some political alternatives
that the society had already discarded as bad or unworkable (slavery,
conscription, state enterprise) just a tiny bit more unthinkable and
made it a tiny bit more difficult to imagine something altogether
outside the scope of familiar possibilities (such as the option of labor-
ers as equal partners). In short, the legal forms we use set limits on
what we can imagine as practical options: Our desires and plans
tend to be shaped out of the limited stock of forms available to us:
The forms thus condition not just our power to get what we want but
what we want (or think we can get) itself.1 20 This perspective com-
120. I have no reason, incidentally, to think that Hurst himself would disagree with this
analysis, since his work has always been devoted to showing how lawmakers' notions of the
practical and functional have been shaped and constricted by the basic categories of their
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pletely collapses the distinction that legal writers sometimes make-
that indeed I made earlier in this article when discussing the Varia-
tions-between "instrumental" and "symbolic" uses of law. One
never has more power than when one has so successfully appropri-
ated the symbols of authority that one's actions are not seen as exer-
cises of power at all, but simply as expressions of sound pragmatic
common sense.
12
Another way of looking at what seems to be the key difference of
approach between functionalists and their Critical opponents is that
the functionalist examines what has actually happened and explains
how it all "works," how each development fits into the pattern cre-
ated by all the others, while the Critic takes each event as situated
not on a single developmental path but on multiple trajectories of
possibility, the path actually chosen being chosen not because it had
to be but because the people pushing for alternatives were weaker
and lost out in their struggle or because both winners and losers
shared a common consciousness that set the agenda for all of them,
highlighting some possibilities and suppressing others completely.
How can one identify the counterfactual trajectories, the roads not
taken? From the experience of other societies, from the hopes of
those who lost the struggle, from routine practices that the same soci-
ety has tried in other spheres of life without ever dreaming they
political consciousness. I think the important difference between him and the Critics is some-
thing like this: He takes the consciousness of nineteenth-century lawmakers-consisting of
such elements as distrust for executive authority, faith in the market, a Promethean urge to
dominate nature. etc.-as the product of a liberal, middle-class mind-set forged in European
historical conflicts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and pretty much fixed since
then. To express this perhaps rather too grandly, for him. consciousness ceases to have a
history after it reaches the American shore; it has only a series of instantiations. The view of
many Critics, on the other hand, is that: (a) no political consciousness can persist simply
because of inertia; enormous energy and effort (though rarely, to be sure, fully self-conscious
effort) must be poured into reproducing it and protecting it from competition and disintegra-
tion, (b) in any case, the content of the basic American liberal ideology has not been constant
over the last two centuries, but has undergone important transformations; and (c) even in
what appear to have been its moments of greatest stability and most widespread consensual
adoption, the liberal ideology was shot through with so many contradictions, so many impli-
cations leading the society in opposing directions, that the maintenance of consensus cannot
be explained simply by the dominance of that ideology. These Critics see their task as ex-
plaining how the basic political ideology. the unexamined background common sense of the
time, was reproduced and transformed and its centrifugal tendencies kept under control: and
they see legal forms and practices as central to these processes. In a nutshell, Hurst sees law as
aproduct of an ideological consciousness applied to practical problem-solving; th& Critics see
law as a primary producer of that consciousness. The difference is partly one of emphasis, of
diverging views of what most urgently needs explaining.
121. See S. LuKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974).
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might be applied to the situation at hand, and from imagination dis-
ciplined, as one hopes, by the knowledge of past failures.
I take Karl Klare to be practicing something like this method in
his history of the conservatizing Supreme Court interpretations of the
Wagner Act.1 22 Klare has been criticized for seeming to assume that
the Wagner Act was radical legislation to start out with. It was, say
his critics, as mildly reformist (or, if you prefer, designed to coopt) in
inspiration as in later interpretation.123 To the extent that Klare's
account is one of the corruption of a radical vision, the criticism has
some bite. Yet the main problem with the criticism is that it takes for
granted a single-trajectory view of historical change; it assumes that
things must evolve along the path they start out on. In the case of
legislation, this path is sometimes identified by a curiously Formalist
method as the "intent" of the enacting legislature, as if that legal
construct had both some definite substance and some privileged
claim to set the course of history! Klare, however, situates the Wag-
ner Act at the junction of myriad potential tracks of departure-one
could identify some of these by the programs of labor leaders of the
time, others by the experiments of labor movements elsewhere, and
still others by the "corporatist" models being practiced in the major
European states and in some American industries-and then shows
how the Supreme Court decisions, informed by a pervasively held
general postwar consciousness on how to secure the conditions of "in-
dustrial peace," systematically helped lead the society down one
track rather than any of the possible others.' 24
122. Klare,Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modem Legal Con-
sctousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN L. REv. 265 (1978).
123. Comment, The Radical Potential of the Wagner Act: The Du O to Bargain Collectively, 129
U. PA. L. RE%,. 1392 (1981).
124. Another, and separate, issue raised by the article is whether any important part of
the history of labor relations is revealed by Supreme Court opinions at all: Are these manda-
rin dictates not absurdly remote from the "real" world of labor struggles? I will try to deal
with this issue in general terms, see notes 127-40 infta and accompanying text; for now, let me
just say that Klare wouldn't claim to have done anything more than to explore a fractional
contribution to the formation of conventional ways of thinking among the elites about "the
labor problem." The Justices borrowed from, and thus hardened by their authoritative ex-
ample, some of the prevailing mentalities of their time. In conjunction with hundreds of
other acts of consciousness-formation, these set the agenda for the ways in which many deci-
sion-makers in that generation framed issues having to do with labor. If one wanted to ex-
pand on Klare's work, one could look for other manifestations of the mentality he describes
on the Court in other institutional settings, as well as for deviating and opposing mentalities.
Kelman, Trashing. 36 STAN. L. RFV. 293 (1984) contains a valuable speculative sociology of
high-level legal doctrine.
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C. Indeterminacy Located in Contradiction
The partial critiques attack the twin determinisms of functional-
ism and evolutionism mostly by means of empirical counterexamples
drawn from Legal Realism and the Law-and-Society movement in
the case of functionalism (in practice, the effect of law varies enor-
mously with differences of power politics, cultural predisposition to
accept it, strength of local custom, etc.) and from comparative histo-
riography in the case of evolutionism (there are many paths of devel-
opment and of legal response; indeed variation in developmental
path is partly a function of legal variation). Taken together, these
partial critiques add up to the proposition that when you situate law
in social context, it varies with variations in that context. Some of
the most original and powerful recent Critical writing, however, car-
ries the claim of law's indeterminate relation to social life a signifi-
cant step further. The same body of law, in the same context, can
always lead to contrary results because law is indeterminate at its
core, in its inception, not just in its applications. This indeterminacy
exists because legd.l rules derive from structures of thought, the col-
lective constructs of many minds, that are fundamentally contradic-
tory. We are, the theory goes, constantly torn between our need for
others and our fear of them, and law is one of the cultural devices we
invent in order to establish terms upon which we can fuse with others
without their crushing our identities, our freedom, even our lives.
One way, therefore, of writing the histories of legal systems is to ex-
amine successive attempts to build structures that will facilitate good
and prevent bad fusion. Such histories can reliably be expected to
exhibit two properties: First, because the structures have usually
been built by dominant elites (though with input from those strug-
gling from below), their content will be ideological. That is, their
methods of sorting out good from bad interactions will contain a bias
in favor of existing orders. Second, and more important because the
fundamental contradiction between the needs for fusion and for indi-
viduality has never been (perhaps can never be?) overcome, legal
structures represent unsuccessful and thus inherently unstable media-
tions of that contradiction. Over time, therefore, these legal struc-
tures will tend to become unglued and to collapse.
According to this vision, modern American legal history is in part
the story of how the latest of these great cultural constructs, "liberal
legalism," arose and developed its own characteristic set of mediating
devices (chief among these being the division of social life into a pri-
vate sphere of contracting individuals, e.g., "the market," and a
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strictly limited sphere of constitutional/democratic collective coer-
cion, "the state"); how the construct was purified of its preliberal
elements and elaborated to its highest pitch in the late nineteenth
century; and how, at the moment of its perfection, it started to decay
under attacks from without and the pressure of its own internal con-
tradictions-ultimately leaving us where we are now, living in its
ruins, no longer believing in its mediating powers, and clinging to it
still because we have found nothing to replace it, and being faithless
moderns, doubting that we ever can. The general framework of this
story has served as the background to a growing number of histories
of particular bodies of legal doctrine and theory, each of which lo-
cates its special set of rules and principles within the fundamental
contradiction and shows how one attempt after another to mediate
that contradiction results in failure.
25
The common thread of these histories is the observation that the
contradiction makes available for the decision of every case matched
pairs of arguments that are perfectly plausible within the logic of the
system but that cut in exactly opposite directions. The managers of
the legal system preserve their sense that law is actually relatively
orderly and predictable by assembling a bunch of devices to keep
these oppositions from becoming too starkly obvious (even to them-
selves). They classify some of the oppositions as "anomalies and ex-
ceptions." They stick others in separate categories (e.g., law/equity).
They rule out still others (the capitalist wage-bargain is invalid, at
least in times of high unemployment, because concluded under du-
ress; the equal protection clause prohibits rationing scarce social
goods by ability to pay) by a separation between law and politics or
simply by arbitrary ideological fiat (interpretations of rules that
would too much alter the status quo are wrong per se). Nonetheless,
these fudging devices are subject to strains that eventually crack
them apart. Enemies of the status quo expose obviously ideological
125. Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 205 (1979),
the pioneer venture in this mode, may be said to have founded an entire school. See e.g.,
Kainen, From Vested to Substantive Rights, 31 BUFFALO L. REv. (1982); Olsen, The Family and the
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497 (1983); Singer, The Legal
Rights Debate i AnalyticalJurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfela 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975; Vande-
velde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property,
29 BUFFALO L. REv. 325 (1980); Note, Tortions Interference with Contractual Relations in the Mine-
teenth Centuoy: The Transformation of Aoperty; Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1983)
For those unfamiliar with the method, an introduction to it notable for its lucidity and
cleanness of line is Elizabeth Mensch's essay on contract law as a mediator between the con-
tradictory desires to promote freedom of action and to guarantee the security of expectations.
See Mensch, supra note 53.
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contrivances for what they are and develop arguments based on uto-
pian counterpossibilities of the system. ("Freedom of contract" as
administered is just the rule of the stronger; contracts can't be really
free unless entered into by parties with "equal bargaining power";
hence, "freedom of contract" norms require regulatory schemes
equalizing bargaining power.) Ordinary lawyers and judges with no
wish whatever to destroy the system lay bare its contradictions in
adversary arguments or dissents. And jurists whose main ambition is
tojustifi the system by showing how clear and orderly it is at its core
end up expounding it so well that its faults appear in plain view.'26
Anyone who has come to adopt this approach has left functional-
ism far behind. For if it turns out to be true that law is founded upon
contradictions, it cannot also be true that any particular legal form is
required by, or a condition of, any particular set of social practices.
And, in fact, one of the skills that the fans of this method have devel-
oped to an abnormal extent is that of supplying, whenever they hear
a claim of functional relation between a legal rule and a social prac-
tice, the standard *counterclaim, with counterexamples, for an exactly
inverse relationship.
V. CRITICIZING THE CRITICS: SOME POINTS OF CONTROVERSY
One of the melancholy truths about Critical Legal Studies gener-
ally seems to be that its students, although many of them try hard to
write free of jargon for wide audiences, have for the most part not
succeeded in communicating their ideas clearly enough to attract
much relevant criticism from outside opponents. Most of the inter-
esting controversies that I've become aware of have taken place
within CLS, among people who consider themselves part of the
movement. I will devote the space remaining here to a brief account
of some of these controversies and will scatter remarks here and there
to indicate where I stand on them. These controversies tend to swirl
around the validity of the approach described in the last section: le-
gal historiography as the intellectual history of the rise and fall of
paradigm structures of thought designed to mediate contradic-
tions. '27 This special kind of doctrinal history is surely the most dis-
126. It would be inconsistent with the Critics' inclination to relativize all historical sto-
ries for them to claim any privileged status for their own, and they don't. Their story is,
presumably, as time-bound in its assumptions and as subject to displacement by other, more
persuasive stories, as any other historical account.
127. Again, this is by no means the only way in which Critics write history. Every type
of partial- or extended-Critical mode that I've mentioned in this piece has defenders and
adherents; and the chief rival to the intellectual-history-of-doctrinal-contradictions approach
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tinctive Critical contribution, as well as the one that has caused most
of the arguments.
A. Argument #I: "The history of DOCTRINE? This is the big
liberating move? You've got to be kidding!"
This argument is more complex than first appears and usually
turns out to consist of several different points:
(1) "You're just doing the history of legal ideas; what we need is
the history of the law's effects on actual behavior in the real world."
This point I think has been sufficiently addressed already: It's an-
other version of the false law/society dichotomy. "The economy" is
no more "real" than "legal ideas." It's an assemblage of conventions
of which "legal ideas" such as property, contract, promissory and
fiduciary obligation, not to mention money itself, are indispensable
elements and propagators.
(2) "But assuming that you're right, that the Material is inextri-
cably mixed up with the Ideal, isn't all this doctrinal history still
excessively Idealist? For one thing, it seems so abstract and bloodless,
so far removed from the world of concrete social experience. For an-
other, the method makes it look as if the history of these legal/intel-
lectual structures were somehow self-determining-as if the
structures rose and fell because of some objective inner dynamic un-
related to the world of social struggle or, for that matter, to real peo-
ple of any kind. Doesn't this just substitute another set of
evolutionary determinisms for the social evolutionism that it rejects?"
This point is troubling, though it is perhaps more about appear-
ance than about substance. It's true, I think, that the kind of struc-
turalist historiography that some of the Critics have written
sometimes reads as if these impersonal structures had a life of their
own and human beings were enslaved to the needs of that life-cycle,
building or demolishing as the World-Spirit might dictate. This ap-
pearance is quite unfortunate because I don't believe that these Crit-
ics want to divorce the life-cycle of their structures from human
agency. On the contrary, their point is that people build these sys-
tems to satisfy their needs for cooperation with, while protecting
against their terror of, one another. As people build, they reify, at-
tributing to their own creations an impersonal determining force
is probably the history-from-the-bottom-up account of oppressed groups struggling against
ruling-class versions of law and for their own versions, inspired mainly by the brilliant exam-
ple of E.P. Thompson's work. See E.P. THOMPSON. THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORK-
ING CLASS (1963); E.P. THOMPSON, supra note 88.
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("the logic of freedom of contract requires that legal lines be drawn
strictly limiting the state's power to affect the substantive terms of
the bargain"). But the Critics, far from believing that these struc-
tures determine everything, spend all their time showing how inde-
terminate they are-how they always lead to contradictory
consequences. What the structures "determine" is not any particular
set of social consequences but the categories of thought and discourse
wherein political conflict will be carried out.
If you accept, or at least are willing to listen sympathetically for a
moment to this defense of the structuralist method, you'll see why it
would be hard for the Critics to do as their opponents ask-to tie in
the story of the rise and fall of structures to narratives of particular
social struggles between concrete interests. The Critics are trying to
describe something that partly transcends concrete interest because it
helps create the conceptual universe shared by all parties to the
struggle. What the parties are struggling over is the power to inter-
pret and to have applied in their favor the (contradictory) implica-
tions of a common set of premises. For example, because most of the
actual work of elaborating the basic terms of political discourse is
done by people at the top of the social pyramid, a historian would, to
a limited extent, be able to tell the story of the rise of a structure as an
elite's attempt to rationalize elite privileges and the story of its fall as
the collapse of the elite's Empire of Reason under siege from the ene-
mies below. Thus, the "classical" legal thought of the late nineteenth
century was the creation of elite, mostly Republican or conservative
Mugwump, lawyers and judges. The critiques that exposed it as ide-
ology did often originate in reform movements considerably to the
left of that elite (left-wing urban Progressivism, academic left-liber-
alism, Populism, the social-planning wing of the New Deal), which
were expressing interests and programs of classes and groups some-
what further down in the social structure. Yet, as this particular ex-
ample vividly demonstrates, such a simplistic narrative would be
incomplete and fundamentally misleading if it cast elite conserva-
tives as the sole architects of ideological mystification and their (rela-
tively) left-wing critics or representatives of lower social classes as the
bearers of Critical truth. Such an account would obscure the extent
to which leftists and lower social classes shared the basic premises of
the ideological structure. And it would obscure the role that elite
conservatives themselves-think for example of Holmes, hardly a so-
cial reformer!-played in the demolition of that structure.
Nevertheless, the structuralist historians are partly to blame for
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the ways in which their work has been misunderstood. They do some-
times write the driest possible Ideengeschichte of doctrinal concepts
evolving and dissolving over time, without paying nearly enough
attention to the applications to which these doctrines were put in
everyday practical reasoning or to the specific controversies or polit-
ical events that suddenly opened up the doctrines to question. The
structuralists would, I think, again respond that legal structures, be-
cause of their indeterminacy, can't be expected to connect in any
predictable fashion with the interests of any particular class or group.
Thus, a writer couldn't put the history of structures in the context of
political events in any way that would make a coherent narrative.
"Consideration" doctrine, for example, has played some part in
building Anglo-American private law structures, 28 but it would be
hard to attribute developments in the doctrine very convincingly to
any one side's political interests.' 29 (Nobody would write: "Agrarian
radicals called for popular takeover of the banks and immediate abo-
lition of the Pre-Existing Duty Rule.") One could concede this point
to the structuralists and still ask them to embed their story in a narra-
tive context that would at least supply subjects and occasions to the
narrative to show that it is human beings with reasons and motives,
not disembodied Spirits, who drive the manufacture of legal con-
cepts: Who pushed which arguments on what occasions and why?
What happened to set off the arguments? What happened to
destabilize previously stable conventions? 130 We ought to have a rule
of style: no sentence without a subject; no intellectual move without
a reason-even if the particular subject and reason may sometimes
be largely incidental to the grander thematic history of legal
consciousness.131
128. On the "latent functions" of consideration, see, e.g., D. DAvis, THE PROBLEM OF
SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1770-1823 (1975).
129. This does not mean, although the people I've called the disengaged think it does,
that "consideration" doctrine has no social importance and should be treated solely as a piece
of legal esoterica; the structuralist approach says that it matters all right, not all by itself, to
be sure, but as a piece of a structure, a complex cultural code.
130. Joseph Singer does this contextualizing very usefully. For example, in the middle
of an extremely abstract history of modern analytical jurisprudence, he uses the context of the
law of labor injunctions to show why it might matter to anyone whether "rights" entailed
correlative "duties" or not. Singer, supra note 125, at 989. A model for this sort of approach
to intellectual history is Q. SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT
(1978), which takes ancient arguments on authority, its legitimate exercise, proper limits, and
redress for violating those limits, etc. through the successive political crises and controversies
in which the arguments were deployed, warped, bent out of shape, and finally completely
recast by the strategies of the disputants.
131. When I say "subjects," it should be clear that I don't just mean individual subjects;
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(3) "All right then, I can see why you want to write legal history
as the history of legal consciousness, and I can even understand why
you think that, although that history is made by real people in social
life, it can be told without reference to pressures of immediate inter-
est. But what I can't understand is why you chose to write about
these particular forms of legal consciousness-case law and treatise
literature produced by the high mandarins of the legal system-in
the first place. After all, isn't part of your theory that everyone in
society-not just lawyers and certainly not just jurists and appellate
judges-produces, applies, and interprets 'law.' And isn't it therefore
perverse of you to stick with the mandarin materials beloved of the
most reactionary of Formalists?"
This is not an easy criticism to answer, but as a start I might say
that I've never heard any Critic argue (as some traditional legal his-
torians have been known to do) that Critical histories ought to focus
exc/usively on mandarin materials. But for an historiographical prac-
tice just setting off on its travels, the choice of these materials does
make a certain amount of sense for several reasons. First, case law
and treatises are relatively accessible. Thus you don't have to do a
lot of digging to get materials to practice the method on, and new-
comers, your students for example, can learn the method and
produce finished pieces of research in a reasonable time. (In a field
like law, which doesn't give people a long dissertation period to do
research and develop their ideas, this is a real advantage.)
Second, the mandarin materials are among the richest artifacts of
a society's legal consciousness. Because they are the most rational-
ized and elaborated legal products, you'll find in them an exception-
ally refined and concentrated version of legal consciousness.
Moreover, if you can crack the codes of these mandarin texts, you'll
often have tapped into a structure that isn't at all peculiar to lawyers
but that is the prototype speech behind many different dialect dis-
courses in the society.1 3 2 For one example, the elite legal thought of
the late nineteenth century ("classical" legal thought, as it's some-
legal concepts are made collectively, and the makers may be officials, judges, subcultures of
professionals or intellectuals, the ideologues of political factions, workingmen's associations,
religious groups, heavy-industry board chairmen, mass movements, or other collectives of
whose existence our limited categories have left us unaware.
I am uneasy about this formulation even as I utter it. My colleague Tom Heller has
vigorously argued that my attachment to narratives with subjects is a sentimental reaction to
a prestructuralist past. For his reasons in detail, see Heller, Structuralirm and Cntique, 36 STAN.
L. REv. 127 (1984).
132. M. TUSHNET, supra note 101, exposes such a structure.
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times called) is strikingly parallel in its basic structure to classical
political economy.13 For another, the transformations in the struc-
ture of legal thought which eventually led to Realism and the legal
ideology of the administrative state have very close analogues in the
rise of institutional economics. 134 But the crucial question is whether
studying elite legal thought will equip you only to study other elite
dialects or whether it will also help you understand the vernacular,
the common forms of legal discourse. It would take a lot of nerve to
answer this with much confidence because I know of very few at-
tempts so far to apply the structuralist method to legal discourse at
the field levels of lower-order officials, practitioners, or private
lawmakers, but it seems plausible to suppose that the method would
work at that level also. 135 My guess is that field-level studies would
reveal a lot of trickle-down effects-a lot of mandarin ideology repro-
duced in somewhat vulgarized forms, 136 and doubtless also mixed up
with a lot of foreign elements (as nineteenth-century American labor
organizers, for example, assimilated the mainstream ideologies of
their culture but mixed them up with elements less often found at the
elite levels-evangelical religion, precapitalist ideas of work, time,
and community, and some solidarist strains of European social-
ism 137). Actually, these effects may not be trickle-down effects at all,
but rather refracted trickle-up effects. That is, the mandarin ideology
may represent simply an elaborated, purified, and formalized version
of a consciousness whose primary producers are to be found all over
the society. If either of these suppositions is even partially correct,
regardless of the actual directions of influence, people interested in
133. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 53, at 660-69; Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An
Essay on the "Relative Autonomy" of the Law, 11 L. & Soc'Y REv'. 571 (1977).
134. See Heller The Political Economy of American Federalism, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
IN THE LIGHT OF THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE - (M. Cappelletti ed. 1984)
(forthcoming).
135. See, e.g., Simon, Legalito Bureaucracy and Class in the Welfare State, - YALE L.J. -
(1983) (forthcoming) (structural analysis originally developed in context of private law doc-
trine applied to study of lower-level welfare bureaucrats); see also J. REID, LAw FOR THE
ELEPHANT: PROPERTY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL (1980) (basic ele-
ments of formal legal rules of property and contract internalized by laypeople and routinely
applied in contexts remote from officials and courts); Katz & Teitelbaum, PfINSJurtdiction, the
Vagueness Doctrine, and the Rule of Law, 53 IND. L.J. 1 (1977-78) (disposition ofjuvenile offend-
ers); Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 303 (1983) (counsels' arguments to
juries in death cases).
136. The common speech of practically-minded people, as Keynes famously remarked,
is often composed largely of the theories of long defunct intellectuals. J. KEYNES, GENERAL
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1936).
137. See, e.g., H. GUTMAN, supra note 74, at 3-117 (1976); D. MONTGOMERY, BEYOND
EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS 237-41 (1967).
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popular legal consciousness would be making a serious mistake to
ignore studies of elites.
Third, in the particular context of the law schools, it has made
good strategic sense for Critics to focus their energies on the decon-
struction of mandarin materials because their method gives each
other and their students alternative ways of thinking about the very
materials that law teachers have traditionally cared about: the core
doctrinal subjects of the first year curriculum. Although the Law-
and-Society movement tried for years to convince traditional law
teachers that these core subjects were "irrelevant" because they
didn't "have anything to do with the real world," it had very little
effect on the teaching and writing that went on in law schools. The
Critics, by contrast, have engaged traditional doctrinalists on their
own turf and have in the process stirred up a fabulous ruckus. My
guess, however, is that this strategic usefulness will not last much
longer; I predict that the forces of the orthodox will simply abandon
their traditional doctrinal ground to the Critics, claiming that "it
doesn't matter anyway, because it doesn't have anything to do with
the real world." Empirical arguments, which used to be the stock in
trade of left-liberal reformers trying to expose the gap between legal
principles in high-sounding pretension and in seamy operation, will
increasingly be heard from conservatives claiming "there's no evi-
dence" that elite legal ideology affects anyone's "behavior." Simple
anti-intellectualism, the claim that all these academic debates over
doctrine are doubtless fascinating to the Rapunzels of the ivory tower
but irrelevant to the practical tasks of lawyering, will also be adopted
by these conservatives. When this happens, the Critics will have to
find new ways of bringing home to mainstream lawyers the historic-
ity and ideological nature of those lawyers' ordinary ways of think-
ing, and this need will force the Critics to try to decode the
vernacular.
The Critics should try to do that anyway. I love the work that
the Critical doctrinal historians have been doing. I think it's among
the most exciting intellectual work being done anywhere and that it
has revolutionized our vision of our legal past. But I also think that,
just as the Critical narrative mode of intellectual history has misled
readers into supposing that the Critics have bought into the idealism
of the old Formalists who thought that legal ideas just "evolved" ac-
cording to some mysterious inner dynamic, its focus on mandarin
materials has led readers to suppose Critics to be trapped in the old
Formalist belief that only specialized-law-stuff-separate-from-politics
[Vol. 36:57
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is law. My point is-and I hope this piece has been persuasive-that
the Critics don't at all think that way about law. As E.P. Thompson
has said about his own work,
I found that law did not keep politely to a "level," but was at every
bloody level; it was imbricated within the mode of production and
productive relations themselves (as property-rights, definitions of
agrarian practice) and it was simultaneously present in the philoso-
phy of Locke; it intruded brusquely within alien categories, reap-
pearing bewigged and gowned in the guise of ideology; it danced a
cotillion with religion, moralizing over the theater of Tyburn; it
was an arm of politics and politics was one of its arms; it was an
academic discipline, subjected to the rigor of its own autonomous
logic; it contributed to the definition of the self-identity both of rul-
ers and of ruled; above all, it afforded an arena for class struggle,
within which alternative notions of law were fought out.1 3 8
Specialized elites may exercise a disproportionate influence on
the manufacture of the forms that go into the constitution of legal
relations, but the forms are manufactured, reproduced, and modified
for special purposes by everyone, at every level, all the time. Critics
are not going to get this insight across if they don't switch their
focus.'
3 9
138. E. P. THOMPSON, THE POVERTY OF THEORY 96 (1978).
139. Some examples of what research into legal consciousness at the field level might
yield are already available. Leon Litwack's study of Southern planters' relations with their
newly emancipated slaves after the Civil War contains a wealth of evidence of how both
planters and freedmen thought about (legal) "freedom" and "property" and "contract" and
of how they tried to put their ideas into practice. For instance, Litwack describes in thorough
detail the kinds of contracts that planters used to bind their freedmen to the land, how plant-
ers, freedmen, local courts, and the Freedmen's Bureau interpreted those contracts, and what
all sides thought about them. He shows, in short, the social/legal relations of contract labor
in the very act of their manufacture. L. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE
AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 336-449 (1979). William Sewall's study of French labor move-
ments in the early nineteenth century shows how French workers carried forward from the
Ancien Regime various ideas of workers' "corporations" founded on a sense of craft commu-
nities and how, in the throes of successive political and economic crises, post-Revolutionary
movements converted these traditional ideas into republican, and then revolutionary, ideolo-
gies of solidary corporate association. This is, in effect, a study of the social/ideological con-
tent of the legal form of the "corporation" from a new angle, the angle of those who borrowed
some of their forms and practices from their rulers but refashioned and combined them with
forms of their own to suit their own purposes and special view of their situation. W. SEWALL,
WORK AND REVOLUTION IN FRANCE: THE LANGUAGE OF LABOR FROM THE OLD REGIME
TO 1848 (1980). And Michael Burawoy's extraordinary participant observation study of a
modem industrial factory exposes the microscopic detail of the processes that engage the
workers' consent and loyalty to the way the work place is managed. One of the many sets of
such processes are those of what he calls the "internal state," the plant's internal equivalent
(grievance procedures and collective bargaining) of the "rule of law" in the wider society-
apparently impersonal institutions through which workers are granted a limited share in gov-
erning and to whose rules all the "citizens" of the plant, workers and management alike, are
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There are already signs of such work being done within Critical
Legal Studies, 4 ° and more is doubtless to come. The more, the bet-
ter, not because workers' or freedmen's consciousnesses are somehow
more "real" than Samuel Williston's consciousness (that belief is a
sentimentalization that obscures how much the consciousness of all
these people springs from the same cultural taproots) but because
we'll never understand the power that legal forms hold over our
minds unless we see them at work up close, in the most ordinary
settings.
B. Argument #2-The Critics who do intellectual-histogy-ofdotrinal-
structures haven't got any theory of the causal relations between
legal/doctrinal change and other social change, except
their claim that the contradictions within legal
structures make such relations completel indeterminate. But this claim
of indeterminacy is surely exaggerated-there are lots of regularities in
legal/social relations
This argument has to be broken down a bit to be responded to. I
think that, at this stage, the response can be very short because much
of it has been answered already. It's true that, for example, the Crit-
ics have not produced an analysis along the lines of the traditionalist
functionalist histories or of instrumental Marxism that relates
changes in the legal system to changes in the economy. The whole
point, recall, of the Critics' critique is that the "economy" isn't some-
thing separate from the "law," which reacts on law and is in turn
reacted upon by it; the idea of their separation is a hallucinatory
effect of the liberal reification of "state" and "market" (or "public"
and "private") into separate entities. Because the economy is par-
tially composed of legal relations, legal and economic histories are
not histories of distinct and interacting entities but simply different
cross-cutting slices out of the same organic tissue. Again, if the Crit-
expected to adhere for the common good. M. BURAWOY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT:
CHANGES IN THE LABOR PROCESS UNDER MONOPOLY CAPITALISM 109-20 (1979).
140. D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A
POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983), for example, is a brilliantly described polemical an-
thropology of the micro-society of American law schools, which argues that the micro-soci-
ety's patterns of hierarchy reproduce and thus reinforce similarly structured patterns of
hierarchy in other social "cells". Elizabeth Mensch, The Colonial Origins of Liberal Properl)
Rights, 31 BUFFALO L. REv. 635 (1982) is a study of the practical applications of ideologies of
legal property-relations at all levels of colonial New York society, from the highest and most
abstract level of general political theory, through mandarin legal doctrine, down to the most
commonplace contexts of legal/political disputes.
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ics want to make this point convincingly, they will have to start slic-
ing their narratives out of field-level uses of law.
The other argument rests, I think, on a misunderstanding of what
the Critics mean by indeterminacy. They don't mean-although
sometimes they sound as if they do-that there are never any pre-
dictable causal relations between legal forms and anything else. As
argued earlier in this essay, there are plenty of short- and medium-
run stable regularities in social life, including regularities in the inter-
pretation and application, in given contexts, of legal rules. Lawyers,
in fact, are constantly making predictions for their clients on the ba-
sis of these regularities. The Critical claim of indeterminacy is sim-
ply that none of these regularities are necessag consequences of the
adoption of a given regime of rules. The rule-system could also have
generated a different set of stabilizing conventions leading to exactly
the opposite results and may, upon a shift in the direction of political
winds, switch to those opposing conventions at any time.
V. CONCLUSION
As this guided tour comes to an end, what shall we say about the
contribution of the Critical historians? Perhaps this: that they have
added powerfully to the critique of the functionalist-evolutionary vi-
sion that has so long dominated legal studies and that they have pro-
duced their own distinctive and exciting brand of doctrinal
historiography and successfully taught others how to apply their
method. The Critics are still a long way from being able to deliver
the brightest promises of their Critical program: thickly described
accounts of how law has been imbricated in and has helped to struc-
ture the most routine practices of social life. But they are trying; they
are getting there.
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